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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin David Lester 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
March 2013 
 
Title: Attentional and Neural Manipulations of Visuospatial Contextual Information 
 
 
A critical function of the human visual system is to parse objects from the larger 
context of the environment, allowing for the identification of, and potential interaction 
with, those objects. The use of contextual information allows us to rapidly locate, identify, 
and interact with objects that appear in the environment. Contextual information can help 
specify an object’s location within the environment (allocentric encoding) or with respect 
to the observer (egocentric encoding). 
Understanding how contextual information influences perceptual organization, and 
the neural systems that process a complex scene, is critical in understanding how 
contextual information assists in parsing local information from background. In the real 
world, relying on context is typically beneficial, as most objects occur in circumscribed 
environments. However, there are circumstances in which context can harm performance. 
In the case of visual illusions, relying on the context can bias observers’ perceptions and 
cause significant motor errors. Studying the illusory conditions under which 
perceptual/motor functions are “fooled”, or breakdown, can provide valuable information 
about how the brain computes allocentric and egocentric frames of reference. 
The following studies examine how attentional (Chapters II & III) manipulations of 
visuospatial context affect components of observers’ egocentric reference frames (e.g., 
	   v 
perceived vertical or subjective midline) and how neural manipulations (Chapter IV) can 
modulate observers’ reliance on contextual information. In Chapter II, the role of 
attentional control settings on contextual processing is examined. Chapter III addresses 
the question of how visuospatial shifts of attention interact with an egocentric frame of 
reference. Finally, Chapter IV examines the functional role of superior parietal cortex in 
the processing of egocentric contextual information. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
CONTEXT, ILLUSIONS AND ATTENTION  
 
In day-to-day interactions with objects within the visual world, an observer is 
required to make many judgments about the local properties of the objects, to allow for 
both the appropriate selection of an object for further interaction, and for coordinating the 
movements required for the interaction. For example, if the observer is searching for a 
ripe piece of fruit, its color and shape is an important cue for selection, and information 
about its location, size and orientation are important cues for guiding and shaping the 
hand for an appropriate grasp. These characteristics are not considered in isolation, 
though. Instead, the observer processes additional contextual information from the scene, 
to supplement the information provided directly by the local properties. Under typical 
circumstances, this contextual information is beneficial – context acts as a critical 
processing aid and allows for accurate motor responses and perceptual judgments. Under 
certain circumstances, though, this contextual information can be misleading, causing 
illusions that distort perception of the local properties. As a scientist, illusions are more 
than just interesting examples of the way in which brain processing can go wrong. More 
importantly, they provide a means by which we can gain insight into the mechanisms by 
which the brain uses contextual information to supplement the local information that it 
uses to perform a task, by studying the conditions in which the process fails.  
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This dissertation will broadly focus on the manner in which the brain forms a 
representation of visual space, using illusions and experimental paradigms that provide 
attentional and neural manipulations of egocentric frames of reference in human 
observers. Classic theories of visual attention and contextual processing will be reviewed 
to introduce the broader focus of this work. Chapter II will examine how an observer’s 
attentional control settings can modulate contextual processing in a visual illusion. 
Chapter III will examine whether (and how) spatial shifts of attentional interact with an 
observer’s egocentric frame of reference. Chapter IV employs a noninvasive neural 
manipulation to examine the role of a sub-region of the posterior parietal cortex in 
processing the contextual information that is used to determine an object’s orientation in 
space. Finally, Chapter V discusses the larger implications of this research and avenues 
for future investigation. 
  
Classes of visual illusions 
Contextual information can influence perceptual organization at multiple levels of the 
visual hierarchy. As early as the retina and primary visual cortex, the mutual inhibition 
that exists between neurons heightens orientation and contrast sensitivity (e.g., Jones et 
al., 2001; Ichida et al., 2007).  Contextual influences also operate at object recognition 
stages of visual processing, for example, that allow the grouping of contours that provide 
the coherent outline of a human face (Hasson et al., 2001). Even an observer’s perception 
of space is affected by the context of a visual scene, with, for example, the edges of a 
doorframe providing contextual information that contributes to an observer’s perception 
of gravitational vertical (Asch & Witkin, 1948).  
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Illusions are often divided into two broad categories (see Figure 1). Illusions 
classified as “local” in nature are regarded as occurring in early sensory-level regions 
(e.g., retina or primary visual cortex), and are caused by the mutual inhibitory 
interactions between neighboring populations of neurons (Bair, Cavanagh, & Movshon, 
2001). Alternatively, “global” level illusions are believed to influence perceptual 
processing at higher, more elaborate stages of visual processing, for example, in posterior 
parietal cortex or the parahippocampal place area (Walter & Dassonville, 2008; Murray, 
Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006). The fact that global-level illusions occupy a high level of 
visual abstraction puts this class in the unique position of being capable of modulating 
feedforward sensory inputs through recurrent connections.  
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Figure 1: Examples of local (A & B) and global (C & D) contextual 
manipulations. A) Simultaneous tilt illusion. B) Zöllner illusion. C) 3D 
rendering of the Ponzo illusion. D) Induced Roelofs effect. (See text for 
description of illusory effects.) 
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A subset of illusions are caused by contrast interactions between target elements and 
adjacent context that share similar features (Blakemore et al., 1970). The simultaneous 
tilt (STI) is a classic example of an orientation illusion driven by local-level contextual 
manipulation (Figure 1A). In the STI, observers are asked to make a judgment regarding 
the orientation of a circular grating of lines, importantly; this central grating is 
surrounded by an annulus of lines that are also tilted (e.g., typically ±15º from 
gravitational vertical). Observers typically perceive the central grating as tilted slightly in 
the direction opposite the annulus (Gibson & Radner, 1937). For example, a central 
grating that is vertically oriented (0º tilt) will be perceived as tilted to the right, when 
flanked by a left-tilted annulus (see Figure 1A). The perceptual effects in the STI are 
likely caused by the mutually inhibitory interactions between the populations of visual 
neurons encoding the orientations of the central and surrounding elements  (Blakemore et 
al., 1970). This same explanation could also explain the Zöllner illusion (Figure 1B). 
An example of a global-level contextual manipulation is the induced Roelofs effect. 
In this paradigm, a large rectangular frame is presented to an observer in otherwise 
complete darkness, positioned so that the center of the frame is shifted several degrees to 
the right or left of the observer’s midsagittal plane. A small target is presented inside the 
frame and the observer must report the location of the target with respect to perceived 
midline (Figure 1D). When the target is inside a right-shifted frame, participants typically 
report the target as lying to the left of its actual location (see Roelofs, 1934; Bridgeman, 
Peery, & Anand, 1997). Conversely, a left-shifted frame causes a rightward pattern of 
localization errors. The induced Roelofs effect is driven by a distortion of the observer’s 
egocentric reference frame (Dassonville & Bala, 2004a; Dassonville et al., 2004b), with 
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the offset frame pulling the observer’s perception of midline in the direction of the frame 
shift. Thus, the target mislocalization occurs when its position is encoded within this 
biased reference frame. For example, in the presence of a right-shifted frame, a target that 
lies at the participant’s objective midline will appear to lie to the left of straight-ahead 
when encoded with respect to a right-shifted apparent midline.  
The Ponzo illusion (Ponzo, 1912) is another example of an illusion that is driven by 
distortions of the observer’s perception of space. However, it differs from the Roelofs 
effect in that it is driven by pictorial depth cues (see Figure 1C), including orientation, 
occlusion, shape from shading/contour, and linear perspective cues, depending on the 
specific experimental manipulation. Some or all of these cues are present in the context 
and act to distort the observer’s sense of perceived depth (but see Prinzmetal, Shimamura, 
& Mikolinski, 2001). In Figure 1C, the distortion of apparent depth causes the observer to 
perceive the top sphere as further away in the scene. This illusion of apparent depth has a 
secondary effect on the perceived size of the rear sphere in the image, causing it to be 
perceived as larger than the near sphere. 
A global contextual manipulation related to the Roelofs and Ponzo illusions is the 
rod-and-frame illusion (RFI, Witkin & Asch, 1948). In the original formulation of the 
RFI, a large frame and enclosed rod were presented to the observer in otherwise complete 
darkness (Figure 2). The frame was tilted off of gravitational vertical (typically by 15°). 
Participants are asked to rotate the rod until they perceive it as vertical. Witkin & Asch 
(1948) found that the tilted frame caused the rod to be perceived as being tilted in the 
opposite direction (that is, a counterclockwise tilt of the frame would cause the rod to be 
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perceived as being rotated somewhat clockwise, so that the rod would need to be tilted 
somewhat in the direction of the frame offset in order to be perceived as vertical).  
Subsequent research manipulated the size of the frame, as well as the orientation of 
the observer relative to the frame, to elucidate the mechanism(s) that cause the RFI 
(Bischof, 1974; Goodenough et al., 1979). The presence of the large tilted frame serves to 
distort the observer’s perception of vertical, with perceived vertical being rotated in the 
direction of the frame tilt. The rotated frame is believed to cause this distortion by 
providing a biased visual cue to the vertical direction that combines with the vestibular 
cues that are derived from the otoliths organs in the utricle and saccule of the inner ear. 
The RFI is similar to the Roelofs effect, in that the frame in both serves to distorts the 
observer’s egocentric frame of reference – this distortion of perceptual space then biases 
subsequent orientation or location judgments.  
 
Individual differences in contextual processing  
Witkin & Asch (1948) employed the rod-and-frame illusion in an early attempt to 
quantify perceptual biases and individual differences in contextual processing. Using 
several instantiations of the rod-and-frame test, Witkin observed a range of individual 
differences in observers’ susceptibility to the effects of the frame, with some observers 
showing large errors, while others showed none. Witkin observed that individuals fell 
along a continuum in terms of their reliance on the context of the frame. A small number 
of individuals were highly susceptible or immune to the effect of the frame, with the 
majority of people falling between these two extremes. 
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Figure 3: Embedded Figures Task. 
Participants must find the simple 
figure (left) within the complex figure 
(right) and report its location. 
Figure 2: Rod-and-frame task. Participant is 
asked to adjust the orientation of the central 
rod so that it is aligned with gravitational 
vertical. The left-tilted frame rotates the 
observer’s subjective vertical in the direction 
of the frame tilt, causing the observer to 
perceive the rod as right-tilted.  
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In subsequent work, Witkin (1950) developed a disembedding task to study the 
cognitive processes that are involved in finding camouflaged visual targets. The 
Embedded Figures Task (Figure 3) required participants to locate a simple geometric 
shape that was presented within the gestalt of a much more complex image. While the 
individual components of the target shape are easy to see, the overall shape of the target 
is hidden within the perceptual organization of the background pattern. Again, Witkin 
noted a broad range of individual differences in participants’ abilities to locate the target 
shape. Some individuals could find the target item seemingly effortlessly, while others 
could not complete a single trial in the allotted time.  
Individual differences in RFI and EFT performance were taken as evidence for 
differences in contextual processing biases. While both tasks differ in their details, they 
are both similar in that the context (i.e., the frame in the RFI, or the complex gestalt in the 
EFT) must be ignored in order to achieve optimal performance. To efficiently perform 
the EFT, participants must effectively ignore the gestalt of the complex image to locate 
the target shape. Individuals that are more reliant on visual contextual information would 
have difficultly performing the EFT, because they do not effectively ignore the 
extraneous features of the complex shape that are obscuring the target shape. Similarly, 
an individual that is reliant on contextual information would also show an increased 
susceptibility to the RFI, due to a heightened processing of the illusion-inducing frame. 
With these ideas in mind, Witkin & Goodenough (1981) examined the behavioral 
relationship between EFT performance and RFI susceptibility and found an inverse 
relationship between the two. Specifically, individuals who excelled at the EFT were 
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typically less susceptible to the illusory effects of the tilted frame, leading to a smaller 
distortion of perceived vertical.  
Individual differences in RFI and EFT led Witkin to develop the theory of Field 
Dependence/Independence (FDI) in the early 1940’s (see Witkin & Goodenough, 1981, 
for a review). The early formulation of FDI was an attempt to characterize an individual’s 
perceptual processing capabilities as active processes, rather than passive computations 
that were constant across the population. Witkin’s idea that an observer’s perception of 
an image was influenced by a “cognitive style” unique to that individual ran counter to 
the commonly held beliefs of experimental psychology at the time. The theory proposed 
that perceptual processing abilities fell along a continuum, with two “cognitive styles” 
that occupied the extreme ends of this distribution. Field-dependent individuals were 
thought to be more reliant on contextual information, with these individuals having a 
greater tendency to integrate objects with the surrounding context. Because of this 
tendency, these individuals would be particularly susceptible to the RFI and distracted in 
the EFT. In contrast, field-independent individuals would tend to focus on local details 
and ignore context. A field-independent individual would therefore excel at the EFT and 
show decreased susceptibility to visual illusions. 
The individual differences approach of FDI to psychological functioning spread 
through a multitude of research disciplines, including child development, perceptual 
functioning, neuropsychology, educational policy, and personality/socialization (Wapner 
& Demick, 1991). While it is now generally thought that the attempts to interpret FDI as 
being relevant to these other disciplines were overblown, the more specific finding of a 
relationship between RFI susceptibility and EFT performance continues to be interpreted 
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as indicating a general tendency to make more or less use of the context presented within 
various visual tasks. More recent work has examined the individual differences in the 
susceptibilities to a wider array of illusions (Walter, Dassonville, & Boschler, 2009). The 
results from that study have caused a more complex image to emerge. Whereas FDI 
would predict positive correlations in the susceptibilities to all visual illusions driven by 
contextual processing, this was not the case. Instead, the susceptibilities to the RFI, 
Ponzo, and Roelofs illusions were found to be positively correlated within one factor, 
susceptibilities to another set of illusions (i.e., the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer illusions) 
formed a second, independent factor. The primary distinction between these factors 
seemed to be the level of processing at which the illusions cause their effect, with the first 
factor containing those illusions that were driven by global levels of context (and, even 
more specifically, distortions of the observer’s egocentric reference frame), and the 
second factor containing those illusions that had their effects at more local levels of 
processing.  
 
Components of visual attention 
The use of contextual information in visual processing is critical for judgments of 
spatial attributes of objects, visual search, and implicit learning (Chun & Jiang, 1998; 
Brockmole, Casthelhano, & Henderson, 2006; Davenport & Potter, 2004). Relying on 
environmental cues, or internal knowledge of contextual regularities is beneficial in real-
world situations. The inherent reliability of contextual information can then be used to 
effectively guide attention within a cluttered scene. However, examining behavior in the 
presence of illusion-inducing context can provide a chance to see how attention interacts 
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with, or potentially contributes to certain visual illusions. A portion of the studies 
included in this dissertation will examine how the attentional goals of an observer 
influence their reliance on context and how shifts of attention interact with illusory 
context. 
Attentional selection of candidate objects within the environment is computationally 
important, because the volume of information contained in a typical visual scene far 
exceeds the processing capacity of the central nervous system. Furthermore, the majority 
of the sensory information impinging on the sensory receptors is not needed for the 
individual’s current behavior goals. The current framework that attention can operate in 
reflexive or goal-driven modes dates back to early formulations attributed to William 
James (1890/1950). Building off of James’ early ideas, recent models of visual attention 
assume that these modes of attention are largely space-based (but see also Chen, 2012); 
these models assume that attention moves to various locations in the environment, and 
any information that falls within the focus of attention is selected for further processing 
(Jonides, 1980, 1984).  
An early demonstration of the perceptual consequences of focusing attention came 
from Eriksen & Hoffman (1974) who showed that providing participants with advance 
knowledge of where a target would appear allowed them to shift the focus of attention, 
which facilitated their detection of a visual target. Subsequent work by Eriksen & Eriksen 
(1974) examined how distracting information affected processing within the window of 
attention. Using a flanker paradigm, participants were asked to respond to a target letter 
that was flanked by incongruent or congruent distractor letters. Congruent distractors 
were the same letter as the central target letter, while incongruent items needed to be 
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ignored to efficiently perform the task.  There was a significant cost when the flanker 
items were incongruent, compared to when they were neutral or congruent. As the 
flankers were moved farther away from the central target letter, the distracting effects of 
the flankers decreased, further supporting a strong spatial component of attention 
selection. Specifically, when the flankers are close the target items, attentional resources 
may involuntary spill over to those items and process their identity, causing a response 
conflict when the distractors are incongruent.  
The development of the spatial cueing paradigm (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 
1980a; Posner, 1980b) was used to examine how stimulus attributes and mental set 
interacted in attentional selection in space. These paradigms were also critical in 
elucidating temporal differences in the modes of attentional selection. In this task, 
observers are asked to detect the presence of a peripheral target that is preceded by a 
spatial cue. In one condition, the cue is a non-predictive, exogenous peripheral onset that 
could appear at the subsequent location of the target (valid cue), or a non-target position 
(invalid cue). Posner showed a reaction time benefit for targets that appeared in 
previously cued locations of the visual field.  In contrast, participants were slower to 
respond to invalidly cued locations, compared to neutral cues, because of the need to 
reorient attention from the initial cued position. The onset cues showed a rapid profile of 
facilitation (~ 50-200 milliseconds post-cue) that quickly turned to inhibition around 300 
ms post-cue.  
The attentional cue in the spatial cueing paradigm can also be spatially predictive of 
the target’s location. In this endogenous condition, a central arrow indicates the likely 
location of the target item. In some respects, this cue form causes behavioral effects 
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similar to those observed with exogenous cues, but differences due exist between the two. 
Predictive cues showed a slower time course of facilitation, with facilitation occurring 
~250-300 milliseconds after cue onset, without any subsequent inhibition. The facilitative 
effect of the cue lasts as long as the observer chooses to maintain the attentional focus at 
that location. This led Posner to propose an empirical distinction between two forms of 
selective attention. In one mode, attention behaved in a reflexive manner, what was 
termed exogenous attention. In this mode, the allocation of attention is driven by salient 
events in the environment, followed by a rapid disengagement and reorientation of 
attention to a new location. Alternatively, selective attention could be driven by the 
demands of the task (endogenous attention), with the decision to exercise control over 
attention being made by the voluntary actions of the observer.  
Volitional control ability is not the only piece of empirical evidence that differentiates 
exogenous and endogenous modes of selection. Despite early psychophysical work 
providing clear support for Posner’s model, early imaging studies demonstrated that 
cortical circuits involved in voluntary and reflexive shifts of attention are largely 
overlapping. However, recent studies have further refined this functional overlap, 
demonstrating that distinct sub-regions of posterior parietal cortex are transiently active 
during voluntary vs. reflexive attentional shifts (Serences et al., 2005; Serences & Yantis, 
2006). The time courses of facilitation and inhibition also differ prominently between 
reflexive and voluntary shifts of attention (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner & Cohen, 
1984; Klein, 2000). The perceptual consequences of selection differ between the modes 
of attention, for example endogenous attention has been found to selectively decrease 
contrast detection thresholds (Yeshurun, Montagna, & Carrasco, 2008). Prinzmetal, 
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McCool, & Park (2005) have suggested that endogenous and exogenous selection operate 
at different stages of information processing. The authors demonstrate in several 
experiments that endogenous selection influences tasks designed to measure the accuracy 
of a representation, as well as the speed with which a response is executed (i.e., reaction 
time). Reflexive orienting of attention, on the other hand, only influences response speed. 
They propose that these two modes of attention are controlled by different mechanisms, 
and serve different functional purposes, such that, endogenous shifts of attention affect 
the fidelity of perceptual representations, while exogenous shifts of attention influence 
decision-level stages of processing,  
In the subsequent experiments, a spatial cueing manipulation will be adopted to 
examine the question of how these two modes of attention might affect an egocentric 
reference frame in a visual illusion.  
 
Involuntary attentional capture 
Following Posner’s seminal work on temporal differences in attentional selection, the 
focus of attention research turned to the specific stimulus properties that can reflexively 
attract attention. The use of peripheral onset cues in the early cueing experiments 
suggested that abrupt onsets (i.e., luminance transients) might have a unique ability to 
reflexively attract attention. Yantis & Jonides (1988, 1990) employed visual search 
experiments to demonstrate that abrupt onset targets were detected rapidly in a cluttered 
display. Additionally, abrupt onset items were also found to be particularly distracting 
when searching for a non-onset target. The propensity for onsets to capture attention was 
argued to be ecologically adaptive, because onsets could signal the appearance of new 
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objects in the environment (for example potential prey, or a looming predator). 
Subsequent work controlling for luminance transients in the search displays, 
demonstrated that the appearance of new objects (see Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994) in the 
environment capture attention in a purely bottom-up manner, completely independent of 
the observer’s goals.  
In a cluttered visual environment, perceptual salience can be signaled along a variety 
of dimensions (e.g., color, orientation, or shape). The importance of these bottom-up 
factors in determining attentional selection has been reflected in most modern models of 
attentional control (Itti & Koch, 2000; Kim & Cave, 1999; Nothdruft, 1993). Theeuwes 
(1991, 1992, 1994) provided evidence that salient features, not just new objects, capture 
attention in a purely bottom-up manner. Theeuwes developed a visual search task in 
which participants searched for a target item in the presence of two salient singletons. 
One singleton was the target item and the other was an irrelevant distractor. Theeuwes 
(1992) asked participants to search a circular array composed of color circles or 
diamonds. Each shape contained an oriented line segment; participants were to report the 
orientation of the line that appeared in the singleton shape (e.g., the diamond). In the 
distractor condition, an additional color singleton was presented in the search array. 
Search performance slowed significantly when the irrelevant singleton was present, even 
though observers were clearly using a top-down set to search for the shape singleton. 
When the salience of the color singleton was reduced, the distractor item no longer 
interfered with visual search. Based on these findings, Theeuwes concluded that salient 
singletons, regardless of their feature dimension, capture attention automatically and 
independent of top-down goals.  
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The unique ability of new objects and salient features to capture attention generated a 
great deal of research in the field of attentional control (Yantis & Egeth, 1997; Theeuwes 
& Godjin, 2001; Yantis, 2000). This bottom-up view of attentional control was 
challenged by Folk et al. (1992) who noted that the distractors used in the early onset 
work shared stimulus properties with the targets. In a concrete example, Folk et al. noted 
that Remington et al. (1992) used targets that were defined by onsets, however the 
distractor items were also defined by abrupt onsets. If an observer is tuned to search for 
onset items, distractor items that possess this same characteristic might cause involuntary 
capture based on the task demands. To convincingly argue that onsets reflexively capture 
attention, the stimulus properties of the target and distractors must be unique. Folk et al. 
(1992) used a variant of the capture paradigm where observers were asked to detect one 
of two stimulus properties (e.g., color or onsets) in the presence of the other distractor 
property. They found that onset distractors were particularly disruptive when searching 
for an onset target, however distractors defined by color had little effect. Similarly, when 
observers were looking for a red target, there was no evidence of attentional capture by 
onset distractors. This led Folk et al. (1992) to propose the contingent-capture hypothesis. 
This hypothesis argues that top-down attentional control settings dictate susceptibility to 
capture. Specifically, the more overlap a target attribute has with the properties of 
distractors, the more likely attention will be involuntarily captured. 
 
Neural substrates of attention and contextual processing 
The first neuroimaging studies of spatial attention used well-characterized 
psychophysical manipulations of spatial attention to examine the neural substrates of 
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goal-driven and reflexive shifts of attention (Corbetta et al., 1993, 1995). Corbetta et al. 
(1993) used both endogenous and exogenous cues to examine activation patterns when 
peripheral locations in the visual field were selected. They observed that two primary 
regions of cortex are recruited when visuospatial shifts of attention are executed, with 
these activations centered in the superior parietal and superior frontal cortices. The 
superior parietal regions were largely recruited when stimuli were selected based on the 
observer’s goals and stimulus salience. Importantly, these activations occurred 
independent of an overt behavioral response. In contrast, the frontal regions were active 
only when behavioral responses were executed to peripheral stimuli, demonstrating that 
these regions coordinate motor responses after attentional selection. Subsequent human 
imaging further supported the model that a frontal-parietal circuit coordinated 
visuospatial shifts of attention (Anderson et al., 1994; Nobre et al., 1998; Gitelman et al., 
1996).  
While these groundbreaking studies laid the foundation for modern research studying 
the neural substrates of attention, they were not without limitations. For example, modern 
imaging technology far exceeds previous techniques in numerous domains, including 
spatial resolution/localization and analysis capabilities. Corbetta et al. (1993, 1995) 
observed that largely homologous regions of posterior parietal cortex, mostly in the right 
hemisphere, were active during peripheral shifts of attention. This pattern of activation 
was observed for attention shifts driven by the cognitive goals of the observer, and by 
salience; these results are consistent with parietal cortex acting as a domain-general 
control center for visuospatial shifts of attention. Recent studies have further refined this 
model, by demonstrating that distinct sub-regions of parietal cortex and frontal eye fields 
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are modulated by voluntary and stimulus-driven shifts of attention (Kincade et al., 2005). 
A series of recent studies – spanning object-, space-, and feature-based manipulations of 
attention – demonstrate that voluntary and stimulus-driven attentional shifts recruit 
distinct circuits in posterior parietal cortex (Yantis et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Serences 
et al., 2004; Shomstein et al., 2004). Across all studies, voluntary shifts of attention 
activated superior and medial parietal lobule, while more ventral regions of inferior 
parietal sulcus were active during stimulus-driven shifts.  
A survey of the current neuroimaging literature suggests potential links between the 
neural circuits that control visuospatial attention, and those recruited in visuospatial 
judgments and the processing of visuospatial context. Spatial attention is inextricably 
linked with all studies of visual perception, as any experimental manipulation necessitates 
selection of task-relevant information. Vallar et al. (1999) had participants perform a task 
in which they indicated when a bar, moving laterally on screen, traversed the perceived 
midline. They observed significant activation in a network of frontal and parietal regions 
when participants had to judge the location of the bar relative to midline, compared to a 
control experiment in which the participant determined the location of the target in 
allocentric coordinates. The strongest activations were observed in the right superior 
parietal lobule and inferior parietal sulcus – regions that have been implicated in the 
control of voluntary and reflexive visuospatial attention (Corbetta et al., 1993, 1995; 
Anderson et al., 1994; Nobre et al., 1998; Gitelman et al., 1996). 
Walter & Dassonville (2008) adapted the induced Roelofs effect for use with fMRI, 
to determine the brain regions that are recruited when individuals make location 
judgments in the presence of the Roelofs-inducing frame. In separate blocks of trials, 
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participants reported the location of the target (presented either with or without the 
context of a Roelofs-inducing frame), or they performed a control task that involved 
judgments of the target’s color. The localization task, when compared to the color task, 
was accompanied by an increased level of activation in a frontoparietal network similar 
to that seen by Vallar et al. (1999). However, there was a significantly greater activation, 
primarily right-lateralized, in the superior parietal lobule (SPL) when participants 
reported the location of the target that was presented in the context of the Roelofs 
inducing frame, compared to the same localization task with no frame present. A similar 
parietal region was seen to be involved in the processing of the illusion-inducing context 
of the Müller-Lyer illusion (Weidner & Fink, 2006). Together, these findings indicate a 
possible role for right SPL in processing visuospatial contextual information. This region 
shows some overlap with attentional control areas, centering largely in the superior 
parietal lobule and intraparietal sulcus. However, contextual manipulations do not show 
the frontal recruitment observed by Corbetta et al. (1993, 1995) and Kincade et al. (2005). 
 
Empirical studies of visuospatial contextual processing 
The experiments of Chapters II & III will explicitly address the role of visual 
attention in modulating, or even serving to drive, the induced Roelofs effect. Recent work 
by Bridgeman & Lathrop (2007) has demonstrated that the induced Roelofs effect can be 
obtained under conditions in which the inducing frame is not consciously perceived due 
to inattentional blindness. This result implies that the effects of the illusion are driven 
solely within levels of visual processing that are immune to attentional modulations. 
However, while Bridgeman and Latham demonstrate that the Roelofs effect can be 
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obtained with an unperceived frame, it is unclear from their data whether the magnitude 
of the Roelofs effect was modulated by this manipulation of awareness. Experiments in 
Chapter II of this dissertation directly test whether attentional set can influence 
susceptibility to the Roelofs effect. 
While the consequences of the Roelofs effect on perception and action are well 
characterized, research examining the mechanism responsible for the distortion of 
subjective midline is lacking. Walter and Dassonville (2006) found a robust Roelofs 
effect with a stimulus consisting only of one end of the frame – the effect was present as 
long as there was an imbalance between the stimuli in the left and right halves of the 
visual display. These results, coupled with the results of Bridgeman & Lathrop (2007) 
have helped define the characteristics of stimuli able to cause the effect; however, none 
has explored its underlying mechanisms. In Chapter III, the role of shifts of attention and 
visual field asymmetries is examined in the Roelofs effect. 
Finally, Chapter IV uses a non-invasive brain stimulation method in humans to 
characterize the contextual processing role of a candidate cortical region of interest. 
Illusion susceptibility in the rod-and-frame and simultaneous tilt illusions is directly 
compared within-subjects after neural computation in this target region is temporarily 
disrupted. The results support a specific contextual processing role for this region, 
independent of potential attentional disruptions induced by the stimulation procedure. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL SETTINGS MODULATE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO THE 
INDUCED ROELOFS EFFECT 
 
Although one’s percept of the world is seemingly flawless, manipulations of visual 
context can sometimes fool the visual system, revealing clues about the mechanisms used 
by the brain to organize our perceptual environment. In one such example, the 
presentation of a large rectangular frame that is offset from the observer’s objective 
midline causes a distortion of the perceived, or subjective, midline (Roelofs, 1935). 
Under these conditions, when observers are asked to indicate the direction that is 
perceived to be straight-ahead, they report their midline as being shifted in the direction 
of the offset frame (Brecher, Brecher, Kommerell, Sauter, & Sellerbeck, 1972; Brosgole, 
1968; Dassonville & Bala, 2004a; Dassonville, Bridgeman, Bala, Thiem, & Sampanes, 
2004; Werner, Wapner, & Bruell, 1953). In turn, this distortion of the observer’s 
representation of visual space causes errors when judging the location of the frame (the 
Roelofs effect, Roelofs, 1935) or the location of a target presented inside the frame (the 
induced Roelofs effect, Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997; Dassonville & Bala, 2004a; 
Dassonville et al., 2004). 
Although a distortion of the observer’s subjective midline is understood to drive the 
Roelofs illusions (however, see also de Grave, Brenner & Smeets, 2002, 2004; 
Dassonville & Bala, 2004b), the mechanism by which the offset illusion-inducing frame 
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causes this distortion is unclear. One way to begin to dissect this mechanism is by 
investigating the level of visual processing in which the frame has its effect. Recent work 
by Bridgeman & Lathrop (2007) has demonstrated that the induced Roelofs effect can be 
obtained under conditions in which the inducing frame is not consciously perceived. 
Using a version of the classic inattentional blindness paradigm developed by Mack & 
Rock (1998), participants had to make a target location judgment in a paradigm that was 
made attentionally demanding by the presence of an additional perceptual task (a length 
discrimination judgment). On a small subset of trials, an offset Roelofs-inducing frame 
was presented while participants were performing the two tasks. When questioned after 
the trial, more than half (54%) of participants reported that they did not perceive the 
frame; nonetheless, perception of the target’s location was biased by the unperceived 
frame, suggesting that this contextual information is integrated even under circumstances 
in which it never reaches perceptual awareness. Indeed, the analysis of Bridgeman and 
Lathrop indicated that awareness of the frame was insufficient to even modulate the 
magnitude of the effect. In sum, these results suggest that the contextual information of 
the Roelofs-inducing frame exerts its effects early in sensory processing.  
Similar to the findings of Bridgeman & Lathrop (2007) with the induced Roelofs 
effect, Moore & Egeth (1997) demonstrated that the Ponzo and Müller-Lyer illusions 
could be evoked even without awareness of the illusion-inducing contextual information 
(see also Chan & Chua, 2003; Lamy, Segal, & Ruderman, 2006). However, other studies 
have typically indicated that, in spite of this, the magnitude of illusory phenomena can be 
modulated by attention within the visual display. For example, the magnitude of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion can be modulated using paradigms that cause observers to focus 
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their attention on one of two sets of illusion-inducing wings that are presented 
simultaneously (Coren & Porac, 1983; Goryo, Robinson, & Wilson, 1984; Tsal, 1984; 
Predebon, 2004). Furthermore, Predobon (2006) demonstrated that the common finding 
of illusion decrement in the Müller-Lyer illusion, or the decrease in illusion magnitude 
over the course of an experiment, is best accounted for by the observer’s adoption of an 
attentional set to ignore the illusion-inducing context, indicating that an observer’s 
internal goals can modulate illusion susceptibility. These studies, and others that have 
examined the rod-and-frame (Daini & Wenderoth, 2008) and Ebbinghaus illusions 
(Shulman, 1992), indicate that attentional selection is capable of modulating the illusory 
effects of contextual elements within the visual image.  
 The report by Bridgeman & Lathrop (2007) that the magnitude of the Roelofs effect 
was not modulated by the awareness of the inducing frame seems to run counter to the 
many reports that attention can modulate effect sizes in a wide range of illusions. It may 
be that the Roelofs effect is truly different from these other illusions, with its effects 
driven solely within levels of visual processing that are immune to attentional 
modulations. Alternatively, it is possible that the Roelofs effect can in fact be modulated 
by attention, but that this effect escaped detection due to the low statistical power 
inherent in the type of between-subject comparison of single-trial measures of illusion 
susceptibility that Bridgeman and Lathrop performed. In the present study, we perform a 
more direct test of the ability of attention to modulate the magnitude of the induced 
Roelofs effect. 
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Experiment 1 
If top-down attentional selection does in fact play a role in the Roelofs effect, we 
might expect the magnitude of the illusion to be modulated by manipulations known to 
affect spatial attention. As an example, the contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis 
suggests that involuntary shifts of attention are contingent on top-down control settings 
that are created based on task expectancies and/or demands (Folk, Remington, & 
Johnston, 1992). Indeed, a number of paradigms have been used to demonstrate that an 
attentional distractor has a much larger impact when it is of the same color as the 
expected target (Folk et al., 1992; Folk & Remington, 1999; Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002, 
2008; Folk & Remington, 2006).  
In the present study, we modified the standard induced Roelofs task to determine 
whether the magnitude of the illusion could be modulated by feature-based attentional 
selection. Participants were instructed to search for and report the location of a target 
(e.g., a red dot) presented inside an offset rectangular frame. The target item was 
presented amongst three distractor items of different colors, so that, in order to achieve an 
optimal performance, participants would be required to maintain an attentional set that 
would filter out the irrelevant colored items. The color of the offset, Roelofs-inducing 
frame was manipulated so that on some trials it matched the participants’ top-down 
attentional settings. If it is true that the Roelofs effect can be modulated by attentional 
filtering, the magnitude of the illusion would be expected to be larger on those trials in 
which the target and frame colors match, but smaller on trials in which the frame is of a 
different color.  
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Methods 
Participants. Twenty University of Oregon undergraduates with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision volunteered to participate for course credit. Participants provided 
informed consent prior to their participation, with all procedures approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the University of Oregon. 
Apparatus. Participants were seated in a dark room with the head steadied by a chin 
and forehead rest positioned approximately 90 cm from the plane of a translucent 
projection screen (137 cm x 102 cm). Stimuli were back-projected (Electrohome 
Marquee 8500 projector with a refresh rate of 60 Hz) onto the screen, and centered at 
eye-level. Eye position was monitored continuously during experimental trials, using an 
Eye-Link 1000 eye-tracking system (SR Research Systems), operating at a 250-Hz 
sample rate. Manual responses were collected as button presses on a game pad connected 
to the host computer.  
Stimuli. At the start of each trial, a white fixation point (RGB values: 255, 255, 255; 
0.9º in diameter) appeared 10° above eye-level at the center of the screen. A large 
rectangular frame (25º horizontal x 12.5º vertical, 1º thick), was positioned so that it was 
centered at eye-level, 5º to the left or right of the participants’ midsagittal plane. Inside 
the frame, one target (defined by color; see below) and three distractors (0.5º in diameter) 
appeared in random locations within an invisible 7 x 3 array of possible locations (Figure 
4). Positions within this array were –4.5, –3, –1.5, 0, 1.5, 3, and 4.5º from the 
participant’s midsagittal plane, and –1.5, 0 and 1.5° from eye-level. Targets and 
distractors appeared in randomly-selected locations within the array with equal 
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probabilities, such that any small display imbalances (and any resulting Roelofs-like 
effects) caused by their presentation would cancel out over the course of the experiment. 
    
 
Participants were asked to report only the location of the target, which could be 
distinguished by its red color (RGB: 255, 0, 0) for half of the participants (randomly 
assigned), or blue (RGB: 0, 200, 255) for the others. The distractors were green (RGB: 0, 
210, 0), yellow (RGB: 196, 196, 0), and purple (RGB: 218, 121, 255) on each trial. The 
Figure 4: Sample display from Experiment 1. Spatial schematic of visual display; 
while the display is drawn to scale, the cartoon observer is not. The array of possible 
target/distractor locations (gray circles) was not visible to participants, and the fixation 
point was extinguished before frame, target and distractor onset. In this set-color trial, 
the participant had the task of reporting the location of the red target (left or right of 
straight-ahead) presented amidst yellow, purple and green distractors within a red 
frame (here offset to the participant’s right). 
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color of the Roelofs-inducing frame varied randomly from trial-to-trial, either red (RGB: 
255, 0, 0), blue (RGB: 0, 200, 255), or yellow (RGB: 196, 196, 0). All frame, target, and 
distractor colors were matched for luminance (0.2 cd/m2). 
For participants searching for a red target, the red, blue, and yellow frames comprised 
the set-, different-, and distractor-color conditions, respectively. Specifically, when 
searching for a red target, the red frame was the same color as the to-be-reported target 
(set-color condition). Likewise, the yellow frame comprised the distractor-color 
condition because yellow was one of the three distractor colors, whereas blue never 
appeared as a distractor color and constituted the different-color condition. Conversely, 
for participants that searched for a blue target, the red frame constituted the different-
color condition, the blue frame constituted the set-color condition and the yellow frame 
constituted the distractor-color condition. Equal numbers of set-, distractor- and 
different-color trials appeared in the experimental trials.  
Procedure. Each trial began with the presentation of the fixation point. Participants 
initiated the trial by moving the eyes to the fixation point, and then pressing a button on 
the game pad with the left thumb. The fixation point was extinguished immediately, and 
after a 400-ms delay, the rectangular frame was illuminated, followed 100 ms later by the 
target/distractor array. The frame and target/distractor array were then simultaneously 
extinguished, with a total frame duration of 200 ms and a target/distractor duration of 100 
ms. Participants were instructed to report the location of the target, while ignoring the 
irrelevant frame and distractors. Participants responded with a button press to indicate the 
target’s location with respect to straight-ahead, with a press of the left index finger 
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indicating a target to the left, and a press of the right index finger indicting a target to the 
right.  
Throughout each trial, participants were required to maintain fixation within an 
invisible, circular fixation zone (2.5º radius1) that surrounded the fixation point in the 
center of the screen. Trials during which blinks occurred, or during which the eyes moved 
outside of the fixation zone (even after the fixation point was extinguished), were 
discarded and repeated at the end of the experimental block. This resulted in a total of 
504 valid experimental trials completed by each participant. Prior to the experimental 
trials, participants performed 40 practice trials, for which performance was not analyzed. 
Data analysis. For each combination of target location, frame location and frame 
color, the perceived location of the target was quantified as the proportion of trials in 
which the participant reported the target as being located to the right of straight-ahead 
(Figure 2). Since the induced Roelofs effect caused by a frame shifted left or right of 
midline is known to affect only a target’s perceived azimuth, trials were collapsed across 
the different target elevations. Psychometric functions were then fit to this data to 
determine the point of subjective equality (PSE, the location at which the targets were 
equally likely to be judged left or right of straight-ahead), using the equation: 
 
 proportion “Right” responses = (1–amp)/2 + (amp x e((tarpos–PSE)/τ)/(1+e((tarpos–PSE)/τ))),  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To prevent the fixation point from serving as a possible allocentric cue to target location, it was extinguished 500 ms 
before target presentation. The larger-than-typical fixation zone was required to offset the increased task difficulty that 
resulted from the requirement to maintain fixation even after the fixation point was extinguished. Possible effects of 
small eye movements away from the fixation point are examined in the Results section of Experiment 1. 
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where tarpos was the actual target location, PSE was the point of subjective equality, τ 
was the slope of the psychometric function, and amp was the amplitude of the 
psychometric function (the best-fit PSE, τ and amp values were determined iteratively 
using a least-squares algorithm in Microsoft Excel). The amplitude parameter was 
included to account for the finding that the floor and the asymptote of the psychometric 
functions often did not reach 0 and 1 in some participants. This effect may have occurred 
due to an occasional inability of the participant to correctly isolate the target from the 
distractors. To quantify the magnitude of the Roelofs effect in each color condition, the 
PSE for the left-frame condition was subtracted from that of the right frame condition, 
with this total effect size statistically compared across color conditions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Typical results from a single participant in Experiment 1. Best-fit 
psychometric functions are plotted for each frame offset (e.g., left and right) 
and each color condition. The point at which each function surpasses a 
proportion of 0.5 indicates the point of subjective equality (PSE) for that 
condition. 
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Results 
Figure 5 shows the typical pattern of results from a single participant, with left-shifted 
frames increasing the likelihood that particular targets are reported as being to the right of 
straight-ahead, and vice-versa. Although the overall magnitude of the induced Roelofs 
effect in each color condition (Figure 6, Table 1) differed significantly from zero [set-
color: t(19) = 6.024, p < .0001; different-color: t(19) = 4.609, p < .0001; and distractor-
color: t(19) = 5.043, p < .0001], a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of frame color [F(2, 38) = 6.751, p = .003]. Planned comparisons indicated 
that the Roelofs effect for the set-color condition was significantly larger than that for the 
different-color [t(19) = 3.485, p = .002], and distractor-color conditions [t(19) = 3.191, p 
= .005], while the effects for the different- and distractor-color conditions did not 
significantly differ [t(19) = –0.651, p = .523]. 
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Figure 6: Mean induced Roelofs effect size (calculated by 
subtracting the PSE for the frame left condition from that 
of the frame right condition) for each of the three frame 
color conditions in Experiment 1. Asterisks indicate p 
< .05. 
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To test for differences in the slope (τ) and amplitude (amp) values across the 
psychometric functions for the different color conditions, separate repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were conducted with frame color as the sole factor, and slope and amplitude 
(collapsed across the right and left frame conditions) as the dependent variables (Table 1). 
The main effect of frame color was not significant for slope (F(2, 38) = 1.38, p = .262), 
but did reach significance for the amplitude (F(2, 38) = 5.08, p = .01), with a smaller 
overall amplitude in the different-color frame condition.  Planned comparisons indicated 
the amplitude was significantly smaller in the different-color condition compared to the 
set-color and distractor-color conditions (t(19) = 2.26, p = .03; t(19) = -2.99, p = .007, 
respectively).  Amplitude in the set-color and distractor-color conditions did not 
significantly differ (t(19) = -.79, p  = .439). 
	  
	  
Experiment Condition Roelofs (°) Slope (°/°) Amplitude (°) 
1 Set-color 2.80 ± 0.44 12.90 ± 1.41 0.90 ± 0.03 
 Different-color 2.13 ± 0.45 10.09 ± 1.25 0.84 ± 0.04 
 Distractor-color 2.30 ± 0.45 12.20 ± 1.59 0.92 ± 0.03 	   	   	   	   	  
2 Distractors-
present 
   
 Set-color 2.53 ± 0.59 11.46 ± 0.95 0.97 ± 0.01 
 Different-color 2.26 ± 0.63 10.83 ± 0.95 0.96 ± 0.01 	   	  	  	   	   	   	  	   Distractors- 
absent 
	   	   	  	   Set-color 2.77 ± 0.59 7.71 ± 0.90 0.99 ± 0.01 	   Different-color 2.30 ± 0.56 6.56 ± 1.01 0.99 ± 0.01 
 
Table 1: Roelofs Magnitude, Slope & Amplitude Parameters (mean ± se) for 
Different Trial Conditions in Experiments 1 & 2. 
	   33 
Eye-tracking analyses. To ensure that the patterns of mislocalization seen for the 
different color conditions were not caused by differing tendencies to break fixation and 
make small eye movements within the invisible fixation zone, we compared the eye 
position at target onset for each combination of frame position and color using a fully-
factorial ANOVA. Importantly, eye position was unaffected by frame position, frame 
color or their interaction [F(1, 18) = 2.89, F(2, 36) = .35, F(2, 36) = .005, respectively, all 
n.s.].  
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that a top-down attentional set, in this case 
an attentional set tuned to color based on a contingent task, can modulate the magnitude 
of the induced Roelofs effect. Specifically, when participants searched for a target item of 
a certain color, the presentation of a frame of that same color caused a larger shift in 
perceived straight-ahead, compared to the significantly smaller shift that occurred when 
the frame color did not match the participants’ attentional set (e.g., yellow frame when 
searching for a red target). These findings are consistent with a contingent-capture 
account of attention as proposed by Folk et al. (1992), with the attentional set serving to 
enhance the effects of frames with colors that match the expected target, or diminish the 
effects of non-target-colored frames through attentional filtering. 
In the paradigm of the present study, the target item for which participants searched 
was always presented among three distractor items, defined by their yellow, purple, and 
green colors. Given this limited range of distractor colors, one might expect that if 
feature-based filtering did occur, the filter might be specifically tuned to filter out those 
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colors. On the other hand, it is possible that the attentional set served to filter out all non-
target colors, including those that were not typically included among the distractors. In 
this latter possibility, one would expect the magnitude of the Roelofs effect for the 
different-color condition to resemble that of the distractor-color condition. Indeed, the 
effect in the different- and distractor-color conditions did not significantly differ, while 
both were smaller than for the set-color condition, indicating that the attentional set acted 
broadly by either filtering all non-target colors, or enhancing only the target color, or both. 
Is it possible that different rates of guessing could account for the difference in the 
magnitude of the induced Roelofs effect measured in the different color conditions? One 
could argue that in the set-color trials, the frame would serve as a potent distractor due to 
its color. This would then draw attentional resources away from the target, causing 
participants to “miss” the target and base their responses on guesswork. If that was the 
case, one would expect psychometric functions with decreased slopes (i.e., greater τ 
values) and smaller amplitudes for the set-color trials. However, this pattern of results 
was not seen in the data (Table 1), indicating that a higher rate of guessing could not 
account for the results. 
Although our findings are consistent with an attentional set that can modulate the 
perceptual consequences of the Roelofs-inducing frame, an alternative explanation should 
be considered. Specifically, it is possible that the similar target and frame colors in the 
set-color condition might have led to an enhancement of the Roelofs effect due to a 
perceptual grouping of the target and frame. Experiment 2 was designed to address this 
alternative perceptual grouping account of these results. 
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Experiment 2 
In order to argue that feature-based attentional processing can modulate the 
magnitude of the induced Roelofs effect, it is important to rule out the possibility that the 
findings of Experiment 1 were the result of the visual system’s tendency to perceptually 
group objects of the same color. The Gestalt psychology principle of similarity suggests 
that when objects have similar characteristics, for example color or shape, they tend to be 
grouped together at a perceptual level (Koffka, 1935). Previous work has demonstrated 
that this Gestalt grouping tendency is capable of modulating illusory effects in, for 
example, the Müller-Lyer illusion, where the illusion is strongest when the horizontal 
segment of the figure is of the same color as the illusion-inducing wings (Goryo et al., 
1984).  
To dissociate these two possibilities, Experiment 2 employs a color-contingent 
paradigm similar to that of Experiment 1, but includes occasional probe trials in which 
only a single target is presented (i.e., distractors-absent trials), with the participant 
required to report the location of this solitary target regardless of its color. Because the 
distractors-present trials are more numerous than the relatively rare distractors-absent 
trials, and because the sequence of trial types is unpredictable, the attentional set 
maintained by the participant to assist in the distractors-present trials should be 
operational during the distractors-absent trials as well. If this attentional set 
concomitantly modulates the effects of a Roelofs-inducing frame, then this effect should 
also be apparent in the distractors-absent trials regardless of the actual color of the target. 
On the other hand, if the results from Experiment 1 depict a tendency for a larger Roelofs 
effect to occur when the target and frame can be perceptually grouped due to like colors, 
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one would similarly expect a larger effect in the distractors-absent trials only when the 
target and frame are the same color and not when they are different colors.  
 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-one University of Oregon undergraduates with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision volunteered to participate for course credit. Participants 
provided informed consent prior to their participation, with all procedures approved by 
the Institutional Review Board of the University of Oregon. 
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to that used in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli and procedure. The majority of trials (75%, dubbed here distractors-present 
trials) were identical to those described in Experiment 1, with participants asked to report 
the locations of red targets presented among green, yellow and purple distractors, in the 
presence of frames that were either red (set-color) or blue (different-color). In the 
remaining 25% of trials (distractors-absent trials), the stimulus contained only a solitary 
blue target within a red (set-color) or blue (different-color) frame, with no distractors 
present. Participants were instructed that when a lone target appeared inside the frame, 
regardless of color, they were to report the location of the target just as they did in 
distractors-present trials.  
In the experiment, participants performed four blocks of 224 trials each, resulting in 
896 total trials (672 distractors-present trials and 224 distractors-absent trials, presented 
in random order). Participants were informed that the majority of the trials would be 
distractors-present trials, and were instructed to report the location of the red target item 
in these trials. When no distractors were present, participants were told to report the 
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location of the single target item, regardless of its color. Prior to performing the 
experimental trials, participants performed 40 practice trials. All eye-tracking and 
rejection procedures were identical to Experiment 1.  
Data analysis. Analysis methods were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
A significant induced Roelofs effect was evident in all task conditions (Figure 7, 
Table 1; set-color/distractors-present: t(20) = 4.404, p < .0001; different-
color/distractors-present: t(20) = 3.69, p = .001; set-color/distractors-absent: t(20) = 
4.819, p < .0001; different-color/distractors-absent: t(20) = 4.183, p < .0001). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA, including frame color and distractor presence as factors, 
revealed a significant main effect of frame color [F(1, 20) = 15.406, p = .001], indicating 
a larger Roelofs effect when the frame color matched the attentional set. However, there 
was no significant main effect of distractor presence [F(1, 20) = .984, p = .333], nor any 
interaction between frame color and distractor presence [F(1, 20) = .785, p = .386]. 
Planned comparisons revealed that the effect in the set-color/distractors-present trials 
was larger than in the different-color/distractors-present trials (t(20) = 2.618, p = .016), 
replicating the results of Experiment 1. Importantly, a similar difference was seen in the 
distractors-absent trials, with a larger Roelofs effect for the set-color condition compared 
to the different-color condition (t(20) = 2.768, p = .012).  
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As in Experiment 1, we analyzed the slope (τ) and amplitude (amp) values of the 
psychometric functions using a repeated-measures ANOVA, with frame color and 
distractor presence as factors (Table 1).  The main effect of frame color was not 
significant for slope (F(1, 19) = 1.51, p = .235) or amplitude (F(1, 19) = .01, p = .917). 
However, there was a significant main effect of distractor presence for both slope and 
amplitude (F(1, 19) = 24.36, p < .001; F(1, 19) = 9.88, p = .005, respectively), but frame 
color and distractor presence did not significantly interact for either parameter (F(1, 19) 
= .11, p = .744); F(1, 19) = .08, p = .776). 
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Figure 7: Mean induced Roelofs effect size for each of the four trial 
conditions in Experiment 2. Asterisks indicate p < .05 
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Discussion 
In the distractors-present trials, a larger Roelofs effect was found when the color of 
the frame matched the participants’ attentional set (i.e., set-color/distractors-present trials, 
where the frame was red as participants anticipated having to search for a red target), 
compared to trials in which the frame was of a different color (i.e., different-
color/distractors-present trials). This replicates the findings from Experiment 1, but does 
not itself resolve the confound that prompted Experiment 2, since this difference in effect 
size could be attributed either to the fact that the frame matched the color of the 
attentional set, or that it matched the color of the target, allowing for an enhanced 
perceptual grouping of the two. 
The distractor-absent trials are key in resolving this confound, since the targets on 
these trials are of a different color (blue) than that of the attentional set (red). Thus, on 
set-color/distractor-absent trials, the frame matched the color of the attentional set, but 
did not match the color of the target; the opposite pattern was true for the different-
color/distractor-absent trials. The finding that the Roelofs effect was significantly larger 
for the set-color/distractor-absent trials indicates that it was the match between the frame 
color and the attentional set that allowed for an enhanced Roelofs effect, not the match 
between frame and target colors. 
Given the expected effects of the distractors, it was not surprising to see an increased 
rate of guessing in the trials in which they were present, as indicated by significant 
decreases in amplitude and slope (i.e., increased τ values) of the psychometric functions 
in the distractors-present as compared to the distractors-absent conditions. However, 
there were no main effects of frame color on the amplitude and slope, nor were there any 
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interactions involving frame color, indicating that the differences in the Roelofs effect 
across the color conditions were not caused by different rates of guessing.  
 
General Discussion 
Our results demonstrate that feature-based attentional processes are capable of 
modulating the magnitude of the induced Roelofs effect – when participants were 
instructed to search for a specific target color amongst distractor items, an offset frame 
with a color that matched the participants’ attentional set caused a larger Roelofs effect 
than one with a different color. Thus, although the Roelofs effect can be obtained without 
a conscious awareness of the inducing frame (Bridgeman & Lathrop, 2007), it is possible 
to modulate the effect with top-down processes in the form of attentional set. Given this, 
it is somewhat surprising that Bridgeman & Lathrop found no significant difference in 
the magnitude of the illusion when comparing participants that did perceive the frame 
with those that did not. However, this null result in their analysis can possibly be 
attributed to a lack of statistical power in their test – given large individual differences in 
susceptibility to the illusion (Walter, Dassonville, & Boschler, 2009), a between-subjects 
test (using only a single measure of susceptibility from each participant) would lack the 
desired sensitivity.  
The current findings demonstrate that the Roelofs effect is similar in some respects to 
the Müller-Lyer illusion, which is also not completely reliant on conscious awareness of 
the contextual elements that evoke the illusion (Moore & Egeth, 1997; Chan & Chua, 
2003; Lamy et al., 2006), but has been shown to be modulated by attentional effects 
(Coren & Porac, 1983; Goryo et al., 1984; Tsal, 1984; Predebon, 2004, 2006). Although 
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the phenomena of visual illusions are often regarded as windows into the low-level 
processes of the visual system, later stages of visual processing, such as feature- and 
space-based attentional selection, can influence illusion susceptibility. Conceptual and 
semantic information has also been shown to modulate the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus 
illusion (Coren & Miller, 1974; Coren & Enns, 1993; Rose & Bressan, 2002; but see also 
Choplin & Medin, 1999), providing further evidence of the extent to which top-down 
processing can affect the impact of contextual information in perception. However, the 
effect of top-down processing is not without limits: observers trained to recognize line 
segments as being fragments of intact rectangular frames viewed in previous training 
sessions, nonetheless showed an induced Roelofs effect appropriate for the line segment 
rather than for the intact frame that it represented (Walter & Dassonville, 2006). 
An aspect of this work that remains unclear is the manner in which the attentional 
modulation of the Roelofs effect is brought about. Under a filtering account, attention 
would serve to decrease the impact of distractors and frames that have colors that do not 
match the attentional set (i.e., an attentional cost to unattended stimuli), while a frame 
with a color matching the attentional set would pass through the filter and have its normal 
impact. In contrast, it is also possible that the perceptual salience of a frame that matches 
the attentional set may actually be exaggerated by its ability to capture attention (i.e., an 
attentional benefit to attended stimuli), giving it a larger-than-normal impact compared to 
frames with different colors. Of course, it is also possible that both costs and benefits 
play important roles. Undoubtedly, the relative sizes of these costs and benefits will be 
just as difficult to tease apart in the realm of contextual processing as they have been in 
other aspects of attentional processing. 
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The findings of the current study indicate that the magnitude of the induced Roelofs 
effect (Bridgeman et al., 1997; Dassonville & Bala, 2004a; Dassonville et al., 2004) can 
be modulated by attentional processing, but it remains to be shown whether the same can 
be said of the original Roelofs effect (in which it is the frame itself that is mislocalized; 
Roelofs, 1935). We have argued elsewhere (Dassonville & Bala, 2004b) that the induced 
and original effects are driven by the same mechanism; if true, then we would expect 
similar attentional modulations for both. However, de Grave et al. (2002, 2004) have 
argued that different mechanisms underlie the two effects. If that is the case, then there is 
the possibility that our current findings will not hold for the original Roelofs effect. 
The Roelofs effect demonstrates the brain’s tendency to use the locations of salient 
objects in the visual scene as cues to the structure of perceptual space. Although, in the 
limited viewing conditions used to demonstrate the Roelofs effect, these cues can lead to 
illusory perceptions, it can be conjectured that, when viewing a well-lit scene, the sum of 
these cues provide generally accurate information for the construction of a reasonably 
faithful representation of space. Given this, the present finding that top-down attentional 
processing can modulate the effects of contextual cues can be inferred to apply not only 
to the illusory conditions associated with the Roelofs effect, but also to the more typical 
use of contextual information for constructing a representation of space while viewing 
well-lit scenes. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE ROELOFS EFFECT DOES NOT REFLECT SPATIAL DISTORTIONS CAUSED 
BY SHIFTS OF VISUOSPATIAL ATTENTION 
 
When an observer makes a judgment about an object’s orientation or location, 
contextual information from the visual scene is typically used to help refine the judgment 
(Asch & Witkin, 1948). However, if the contextual information contained within the 
scene is misleading, visual illusions can occur.  In a classic example, Roelofs (1935) 
presented an observer with a large rectangular frame positioned so that one edge of the 
frame was aligned with the observer’s objective midline. To the observers, though, this 
was not how it appeared -- when asked to adjust the frame so that the edge was directly 
ahead, the observers shifted the frame even further in the direction of the offset. Roelofs’ 
early experiments revealed that the presence of the large rectangular frame causes a 
distortion of the observer’s subjective midline, with the midline biased in the direction of 
the offset frame (Brecher et al., 1972; Brosgole, 1968; Werner, Wapner, & Bruell, 1953). 
A direct demonstration of this effect can be achieved by simply asking observers to point 
or make a saccadic eye movement to straight ahead in the presence of an offset frame. 
The observer’s motor response typically deviates toward the center of the frame 
(Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Dassonville et al., 2004). In a recent adaptation of the classic 
Roelofs illusion, observers are asked to make a perceptual report of the location of a 
visual probe presented within the offset rectangular frame (i.e., the induced Roelofs 
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effect; Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997). The frame-induced distortion of subjective 
midline causes participants to systematically mislocalize the probe as being displaced in a 
direction opposite the frame offset (Dassonville & Bala, 2004). For example, a right-
shifted frame will cause a deviation of the apparent midline to the right, which, in turn, 
causes the enclosed target to appear to lie further to the left.  
The primary focus of research on the Roelofs illusion, and the related induced 
Roelofs effect, has focused on understanding the consequences of a biased subjective 
midline on perception and action. However, research that explicitly examines the 
mechanism responsible for the distortion of subjective midline is lacking. Bridgeman and 
Latham (2007) demonstrated that an offset frame would cause the effect even when it 
was presented under conditions that would cause the frame to go unperceived due to 
inattentional blindness. It has also been shown that the effect can be obtained using 
stimuli other than the large rectangular frame that is typically used to demonstrate the 
phenomenon. Walter and Dassonville (2006) found a robust Roelofs effect with a 
stimulus consisting only of one end of the frame – the effect was present as long as there 
was an imbalance between the stimuli in the left and right halves of the visual display. 
But while these studies have further defined the characteristics of stimuli able to cause 
the effect, none has explored its underlying mechanisms. What is it about an imbalanced 
visual image that causes a distortion in the observer’s subjective midline? 
The Roelofs effect is typically tested under visually impoverished conditions. 
Observers are placed in total darkness and the frame is the primary visual contextual 
information in the environment. The onset of the frame is a very abrupt and salient 
perceptual event, one that would likely cause immediate attentional capture. One intuitive 
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hypothesis is that the onset of the frame acts to automatically capture attention.  The shift 
of attention toward the frame could, in turn, pull the observer’s subjective midline in the 
same direction. Links between shifts of attention and egocentric reference frames have 
not been empirically tested. However, hints in the attention localization literature suggest 
that these links could exist.  
Past research has demonstrated that the accuracy of an attempt to locate a briefly 
presented target item decreases when covert attention is directed away from the target 
(Newby & Rock, 2001; Tsal, 1999; Tsal & Bareket, 1999; Butler, 1980). Tsal & Bareket 
(1999) observed that not only did target localization vary when attention was shifted in 
the visual field, target reports also tended to systematically deviate away from the locus 
of attention, in the direction of the horizontal meridian. In addition, clinical evidence 
suggests that the current locus of spatial attention can act as an egocentric reference 
frame that the brain uses to encode the location of objects.  McCloskey & Rapp (2000) 
describe a patient who perceives objects as being in their mirror image locations with 
respect to the locus of attention (i.e., an object to the right of the attentional locus is 
mislocalized to the left; see also Rhodes & Montgomery, 1999, 2000; Flevaris et al., 
2001).   
Potential anatomical links between the control of visuospatial attention and the 
computation of egocentric reference frames can be drawn from the neuroimaging 
literature. Vallar et al. (1999) had participants perform a task in which they indicated 
when a bar, moving laterally on screen, traversed perceived midline. The researchers 
observed a significant activation in a network of frontal and parietal regions when 
participants had to judge the location of the bar relative to midline, compared to a control 
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experiment where the bar’s location was reported within an allocentric reference frame. 
The strongest activations were observed in in the right superior parietal lobule and 
inferior parietal sulcus – regions that have been implicated in the control of voluntary and 
reflexive visuospatial attention (Corbetta et al., 1993, 1995; Anderson et al., 1994; Nobre 
et al., 1998; Gitelman et al., 1996). In a recent study, Walter & Dassonville (2008) 
adapted the induced Roelofs effect for use with fMRI, to determine the brain regions that 
are recruited when individuals make location judgments in the presence of Roelofs-
inducing frame. In separate blocks of trials, participants reported the location of the target 
in the presence of the offset frame, or performed a control task that involved a color 
judgment. During the target localization task, a significant, primarily right-lateralized 
activation was observed in the superior parietal lobule (SPL), indicating a possible role 
for right SPL in processing visuospatial contextual information.            
Recent psychophysical work (Lester & Dassonville, 2011) has also shown that the 
midline distortion observed in the induced Roelofs effect can be modulated by an 
observer’s attentional goals. Using a modified color-contingency paradigm (see Folk, 
Leber, & Egeth, 2005), participants reported the location of a target item (e.g., a red 
target, presented amidst distractors of other colors) presented inside the offset frame. The 
magnitude of the midline distortion was largest when the frame matched the color of the 
target item. While this study was designed to examine attentional filtering for colors and 
not to explicitly measure discrete shifts of attention, the attentional modulation raises the 
possibility that shifts of visuospatial attention may influence individuals’ perception of 
straight-ahead.  
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In the current study, we explore the possibility that the distortion of the apparent 
midline associated with the Roelofs effect is driven by an attentional shift in the direction 
of the offset frame. Specifically, we examine whether shifts of visuospatial attention, 
using a modified Posner cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 
1980), affect perceived straight-ahead. On the majority of trials, participants performed a 
letter identification task that was preceded by a spatial cue that was either spatially non-
predictive (Experiments 1 & 3) or predictive (Experiment 2) of the letter’s subsequent 
location. Accuracy in the identification task allowed for an assessment of the cues’ 
effectiveness in attracting the observer’s spatial attention across trials. However, on 
occasional, unpredictable trials, the letter was replaced with a visual probe whose 
location was to be reported by the participant. An assessment of the performance in the 
localization task allowed for a determination of whether the earlier cue and resulting shift 
of attention are capable of causing a distortion of the participant’s spatial reference frame 
If spatial shifts of attention are the underlying cause of the Roelofs effect, we predict 
that that participant’s subjective midline will be yoked with the locus of spatial attention. 
Specifically, when attention shifts to the left visual hemifield, subjective midline will be 
pulled to the left, causing the participant to report the location of the visual probe as lying 
further to the right than it really is; the opposite effects would occur with a rightward 
attention shift. In contrast, if subjective midline is not drawn to the locus of attention, 
localization performance should not be significantly affected by the shift of attention. 
This pattern of findings would indicate that the imbalanced visual display used to 
generate the Roelofs effect does so through a mechanism that is independent of any shifts 
of attention. 
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Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants.  Fourteen University of Oregon undergraduates with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision volunteered to participate for course credit. Participants 
provided informed consent prior to their participation, with all procedures approved by 
the Institutional Review Board of the University of Oregon.  
Apparatus. Stimuli were back-projected onto a translucent screen (137 cm x 102 cm), 
using an Electrohome Marquee 8500 projector with a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz. 
Manual responses were collected using a keyboard connected to the host computer. 
Stimuli were centered at eye-level while participants were seated in a completely-
darkened room. Participants’ eye position was monitored on-line using an Eye-Link 1000 
eye-tracking system (SR Research), operating at a 250-Hz sampling rate. Using a tower-
mounted tracker setup, participants sat comfortably with their heads steadied by chin and 
forehead rests, approximately 90 cm from the plane of the presentation screen. Eye 
position was monitored continuously during experimental trials; trials during which an 
eye movement or blink occurred were discarded and repeated at the end of the 
experimental block. Participants were required to maintain fixation within a fixation zone 
throughout the trial, even after the fixation point was extinguished at the start of the trial 
(the fixation point was removed so that it could not be used as an allocentric localization 
cue). A relatively large fixation zone (2.5° radius) was used to allow for the possible 
small movements of the eye that occur during fixation in complete darkness, especially 
with covert attention focused in the periphery (Hafed & Clark, 2002, Engbert & Kliegl, 
2003; Laubrock, Engbert, & Kliegl, 2005; but see Horowitz et al., 2007). However, it is 
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possible that small eye movements within the fixation zone might themselves cause a 
mislocalization of the visual probes (see, for example, Henriques et al., 1998). For this 
reason, eye position was included as a variable in all regression analyses of the probe 
localization data.  
 
 
Probe localization training.  Prior to beginning Experiment 1, each participant 
completed a short period of training (100 trials) in which they learned an array of five 
possible locations (8° below fixation, and -3°, -1.5°, 0°, 1.5° and 3° from midline) for the 
visual probe that would be used in the later localization trials. Each trial began with the 
Figure 8: Sample trials of the letter identification (left) and probe localization tasks 
(right) from Experiment 1.  The identification trial is an example of the validly 
cued condition, in which the cue and target letter appear in the same spatial 
position.  In localization trials, participants reported the perceived location of the 
visual probe within an array of previously learned probe positions (not seen).  All 
timing procedures were identical across the tasks, except the masks were not 
presented in the localization trials.  The exogenous cue was never predictive of the 
subsequent target position in either task. 
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presentation of a central white fixation point (1° in diameter); participants fixated this 
point and pressed the spacebar when they were ready to begin a trial. After a 200 ms ISI, 
a small white probe (1° in diameter) appeared in one of the five possible locations for 1 s. 
Participants were asked to report the perceived location of the probe by pressing one of 
five corresponding keys on the keyboard with the fingers of the right hand keyboard key 
(thumb on the right arrow key for a probe in the -3° location, index finger on the “1” of 
the number pad for the probe at the -1.5° location, middle finger on the “2” for the probe 
at the 0° location, ring finger on the “3” for the probe at the 1.5° location, and little finger 
on the Enter key of the number pad for the probe at the 3° location). 
Feedback (2 s duration, starting 500 ms after the keyboard response) was included to 
help participants learn the probe array more quickly and accurately. If participants 
indicated the correct position of the probe, the word “Correct” appeared just above 
fixation. If they reported the incorrect location, “Incorrect” appeared along with the true 
position of the probe, to assist in learning the probe positions. Feedback was visible for 2 
seconds before the fixation point reappeared and participants were free to begin the next 
trial.  Average accuracy for the training period was 81% (SE = 2.70) and significantly 
above chance (t(13) = 11.43, p < .001), demonstrating that participants successfully 
memorized the locations of items in the probe array.  
Stimuli and experimental procedure. Each participant completed 21 practice trials to 
gain familiarity with the task, followed by 252 experimental trials. The majority of the 
experimental trials (144 of 252 trials) were letter identification trials, in which 
participants reported the identity of a target letter that followed an attentional cue. The 
remaining trials (108 of 252) were probe localization trials, in which participants 
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reported the location of a visual probe in the same manner that was learned in the earlier 
localization training (previous section). Attention and localization trials appeared in a 
random order, with no advance warning to indicate the type of trial to expect. Both types 
of trials included a non-predictive attention cue that could appear to the left or right of 
fixation, or bilaterally. Participants were informed of the non-predictive nature of the cue 
and were instructed to ignore it and concentrate on either identifying the target letter or 
reporting the location of the visual probe, whichever appeared in the course of a trial. 
Participants were instructed to emphasize accuracy in their responses, rather than speed. 
Letter identification trials. Every trial (Figure 8, left) began with the presentation of a 
central fixation point (1° diameter). Participants initiated the trial by moving the eyes to 
the fixation point, and then pressing the keyboard spacebar with the left hand. The central 
fixation point then disappeared; after a 500 ms ISI, a small peripheral cue (0.8° in width x 
2.5° in height) appeared for 50 ms. This exogenous cue appeared randomly on the left or 
right, 19° from fixation, or bilaterally. Following the peripheral cue (150 ms SOA), a 
single target letter (E or H) and a figure-8 (3° x 6°) were presented (50 ms duration) 
simultaneously, 15° from fixation. After a 50 ms ISI, two visual masks (figure-8, 3° x 6°, 
100 ms duration) appeared to obscure any residual visual information. 
Participants were instructed to report the identity of the target letter by pressing one 
of two keys with their left hand (“x” with their index finger if the letter was an H, “z” 
with their middle finger if the letter was an E). Trials were categorized according to the 
locations of the exogenous cue and target letter. For valid cue trials, the exogenous cue 
and target letter appeared on the same side of fixation. In invalid cue trials, the cue and 
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target letter appeared on opposite sides of fixation. Neutral cue trials included bilateral 
exogenous cues.     
Probe localization trials. Localization trials (Figure 8, right) began in an identical 
fashion as the identification trials, with a fixation point that was followed after 500 ms by 
the appearance of an attentional cue presented 19° left or right of the fixation point, or 
bilaterally. However, no letter targets or visual masks followed the attentional cue. 
Instead, following the attentional cue (150 ms SOA), a small white circular probe (1° 
diameter) appeared in one of the possible probe locations (8° below fixation, and -1.5°, 0° 
or 1.5° from midline) that were learned during the earlier training procedure (see the 
localization training, above). However, unlike the training period and unbeknownst to the 
participants, probes in the experimental trials could appear only in the central three 
locations of the array of locations, to accommodate possible mislocalizations due to the 
prior attentional cue and minimize the occurrence of probes that appeared further right 
(or left) of the rightmost (or leftmost) locations in the learned array. To end the trial, 
participants reported the location of the probe using the key press procedure they had 
learned in the earlier training.  
 
Results 
A repeated-measures ANOVA of the accuracies in the letter identification trials 
(Figure 9) demonstrated that there was a significant main effect of cue validity (F(2, 26) 
= 7.50, p < .005, η2 = .37), with valid cues (M = 74.3% correct, SE = 4.46) resulting in a 
significantly greater accuracy in letter identification, compared to the neutral (M = 69.0%, 
SE = 4.27) and invalid cues (M = 65.3%, SE = 3.29). Separate contrasts revealed that 
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valid cues led to a significantly greater accuracy compared to the neutral (t(13) = 3.77, p 
< .005) and invalid cues (t(13) = 2.45, p < .05); however, accuracy for neutral cues was 
not significantly greater than that for invalid cues (t(13) = -1.65, p = .124).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To isolate the effects of the attentional cue on the ability to determine the location of 
the visual probe in localization trials, the perceptual reports of probe location were 
assessed with respect to the independent variables of probe location, eye position at target 
offset, and cue location using a block-wise multiple regression (with the independent 
variables entered in that order). Eye position was included as a factor to rule out the  
Figure 9: Percent correct in the letter identification task of Experiment 1. 
Errors bars represent standard error estimates for each cue condition.   
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possibility that any apparent cue effects were not simply caused by the cue’s tendency to 
evoke small eye movements (within the 2.5° radius of the fixation window). As expected, 
probe location was the largest predictor of perceived location, accounting for 
approximately 43% of the variance (R2 = .43, ß = .659, t(1510) = 34.02, p < .001).  Eye 
position at target offset was only a marginally significant predictor of perceived location 
(R2 = .008, ß = .033, t(1509) = 1.71, p = .09), accounting for less than 1% of the variance. 
Importantly, even after accounting for the variability associated with probe location and 
eye position, the factor of cue position was a significant predictor of the perceived 
location of the probe (R2 = .08, ß = -.278, t(1508) = -15.48, p < .001), accounting for 
approximately 8% of the variance in the reported probe location. The mean reported 
Figure 10: Perceived probe location in the localization task of Experiment 1, 
plotted with respect to the actual probe location (negative values indicate locations 
to the left of fixation). Data is plotted separately for the right cue, left cue and 
neutral cue conditions. 
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difference in the location of the probe (right cue – left cue conditions) was 0.94°, with 
probes reported in the opposite direction as the peripheral cue (Figure 10).  
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, exogenous attentional cues were used to cause reflexive shifts of 
attention. Subjects then reported the identity of a subsequent letter (identification trials) 
or the location of a visual probe (localization trials) in randomly intermixed trials. The 
pattern of results in the identification trials clearly indicated that the attentional cues were 
effective at summoning attention, allowing for more accurate identification of the target 
letter after valid cues. In the localization trials, the presence of the attentional cues led to 
biases in the participants’ reports of probe location, with the probes reported to occupy 
locations shifted in the direction opposite the exogenous cue. 
In the induced Roelofs effect, a large frame presented in a location offset from the 
observer’s objective midline has the tendency to cause the apparent midline to become 
deviated in the direction of the frame (Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Dassonville et al., 
2004). This bias in the apparent midline subsequently causes a pattern of errors in probe 
localization, with the probe perceived to be shifted in the direction opposite the frame 
shift.  The effects of the lateralized attentional cue in the current experiment strongly 
mirror (in direction and magnitude) the biased perceptual reports observed in the Roelofs 
literature, suggesting that the effects are one and the same. This serves as a replication of 
the findings of Walter and Dassonville (2006), who showed that stimuli much smaller 
than the typical large frame are able to induce the effect. 
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The results of Experiment 1 also support the hypothesis that shifts of visuospatial 
attention can bias an observer’s apparent midline and possibly serve as the underlying 
cause of the Roelofs effect. However, there is an alternative explanation that must be 
entertained. While the paradigm of Experiment 1 did successfully manipulate the 
distribution of visuospatial attention, it involved the use of displays that were unbalanced 
in their visual content, with an attentional cue that was presented either to the left or right 
of the visual display. It may be that it is the mere presence of an unbalanced display may 
be sufficient to distort participants’ subjective midline, independent of any effects that 
display may have on attentional deployment.  This alternative explanation is examined in 
Experiment 2, in a paradigm that generates shifts of attention without the use of 
unbalanced visual displays. 
 
Experiment 2 
The deployment of visuospatial attention is influenced by visual information that falls 
broadly into two categories: 1) events within the visual environment (i.e., stimulus-driven 
or exogenous orientation of attention), and 2) the goals/intentions of an observer (i.e., 
goal-driven or endogenous orientation) (Posner, 1980). In Experiment 1, a classic 
stimulus-driven manipulation of attention was employed. In Experiment 2, shifts of 
spatial attention were achieved by providing participants with advance knowledge of the 
likely position of a target letter. Specifically, a centrally presented endogenous cue 
indicated the probable location of the target, so that participants could orient spatial 
attention accordingly. If the perceived location of a visual probe is affected by attentional 
shifts that are not accompanied by unbalanced visual displays, it would provide strong 
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supporting evidence that the Roelofs effect is driven by a shift of attention toward the 
illusion-inducing offset frame. 
 
Methods 
Participants.  Seventeen University of Oregon undergraduates with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision volunteered to participate for course credit. Participants 
provided informed consent prior to their participation, with all procedures approved by 
the Institutional Review Board of the University of Oregon. 
Apparatus.  The apparatus was identical to that in Experiment 1. 
Probe localization training.  To familiarize themselves with the array of 5 possible 
probe locations, participants completed a training procedure identical to that of 
Experiment 1.  Average accuracy was significantly greater than chance (M = 78.9% 
correct, SE = 1.82; t(16) = 15.83, p < .001). 
Stimuli.  All stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, except for the attentional cue. A 
predictive cue (75% valid) was presented in the center of the display screen after the 
offset of the fixation point. The endogenous cue consisted of two chevrons (2.5° x 2.5°) 
that pointed either to the left (i.e., <<) or right (i.e., >>) target position, to indicate the 
likely position of the subsequent target letter.  In neutral trials, the chevrons (2.5° x 2.5°) 
pointed to both target positions (e.g., <>).     
Experimental procedure.  All procedures were identical to Experiment 1, except 
where noted. Participants completed 37 practice trials and 296 experimental trials. The 
majority of the experimental trials were identification trials (222 of 296 trials), with the 
remaining localization trials (74 of 296).  
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Letter identification trials. In valid trials (75% of the attention trials), the tips of the 
chevrons indicated the correct location of the target letter. In invalid trials (12.5%), the 
incorrect target location was indicated. In neutral trials (12.5%), the chevrons pointed to 
both locations (e.g., <>), indicating that the target was equally likely to appear at either 
location. Participants were informed of these probabilities and were encouraged to shift 
attention in the direction indicated by the cue, because a target letter was likely to appear 
at that location.  An 850 ms SOA elapsed between the onset of the cue and the target 
letter.  
Probe localization trials. The localization trials were identical to those of Experiment 
1, except for the use of the endogenous attentional cues and the longer SOA (850 ms) 
described above for the letter identification trials. The endogenous cue was never 
predictive of the location of the localization probe.  
 
Results 
In the identification trials (Figure 11), a main effect of cue validity was again 
observed (F(2, 32) = 20.20, p < .001, η2 = .56), with participants having a significantly 
greater accuracy in reporting the target letter when it was proceeded by a valid cue (M = 
79.0% correct, SE = 1.85) compared to invalid (M = 61.23%, SE = 2.54; t(16) = 5.84, p 
< .001) and neutral cues (M = 70.84%, SE = 2.26; t(16) = 3.64, p < .005). The invalid cue 
also led to a significant behavioral cost, with a decreased accuracy following invalid cues 
compared to the trials with neutral cues (t(16) = -3.17, p < .005). 
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For the localization task, a block-wise multiple regression was again conducted, using 
probe location, eye position at target offset, and cue location as independent variables 
(with the variables entered in this order). Probe location accounted for approximately 
76% of the variance in participants’ responses (R2 = .76, ß = .874, t(1220) = 62.96, p 
< .001).  Eye position was also a significant predictor of perceived probe location (R2 
= .01, ß = .041, t(1219) = 2.92, p = .004), although it accounted for a much smaller 
proportion of the variance (1%). In addition, cue location was a significant predictor of 
target report, even when eye position was taken into account (ß = .032, t(1218) = 2.27, p 
< .05), but it accounted for an even smaller proportion of the variance (0.001%). The 
mean reported difference in the location of the probe (right cue – left cue conditions) was 
Figure 11: Percent correct in the letter identification task of 
Experiment 2. Errors bars represent standard error estimates for 
each cue condition. 
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0.13°, with probes reported in the direction of the locus of attention (Figure 12). It should 
be noted that not only was this distortion of perceived probe location much smaller than 
that seen with the exogenous cues of Experiment 1 or the typical Roelofs effect, the bias 
was in the opposite direction as well, with probes reported to be shifted toward the 
attended location after endogenous cues but away from the attended location after 
exogenous cues. 
 
  
Figure 12: Perceived probe location in the localization task of Experiment 2, 
plotted with respect to the actual probe location (negative values indicate locations 
to the left of fixation). Data is plotted separately for the right cue, left cue and 
neutral cue conditions. 
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Since the effect of the endogenous cues on probe localization was so small, with 
borderline significance, we sought additional evidence that the effect was real. Given the 
individual differences that exist in the magnitude of the validity effect, one might expect 
to find a correlation between the magnitude of the validity effect and the associated bias 
in the probe localization task. Indeed, there was a significant positive correlation (R2 
= .45, p = .003; Figure 13) between the validity effect in the identification trials (% 
correct valid – % correct invalid) and the perceptual bias from the localization trials 
(mean error with left cue – mean error with right cue). This result indicates that the more 
effectively the participant used the cue to orient attention, the more biased was their 
perception of the probe’s location.  
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, endogenous central cues were used to elicit shifts of spatial attention. 
Performance in the letter identification task demonstrated that participants successfully 
oriented attention to the cued location, with valid cues leading to increased accuracy in 
identifying the letters, and invalid cues leading to decreased accuracy.  
The endogenous shift of attention was also accompanied by a bias in the perceptual 
reports of probe location in the localization trials, even after accounting for the bias in the 
reported probe locations caused by differences in eye position. When participants 
attended to the cued location in the right (or left) visual hemifield, participants on average, 
reported the visual probe to be further to the right (or left) compared to when attention 
was in the other hemifield. While this effect was quite small (and barely apparent in the 
plot of the data in Figure 12), it was statistically significant, and was replicated in a 
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number of other endogenous cueing tasks in our laboratory (unpublished observations). 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the mislocalization caused by the endogenous cue was 
significantly correlated with the strength of the cueing effect – participants that showed a 
greater cueing effect reliably showed a greater mislocalization. 
 
 
Although other studies have reported varying degrees of perceptual mislocalization 
when attention is directed to peripheral locations in the visual field, the typical results in 
the literature differ somewhat from those presented here. In particular, whereas we found 
that the perceived location of the probe was attracted toward the locus of attention, most 
Figure 13: Relationship between cueing effect and the distortion of perceived 
probe location in individual participants.  Cueing effect was calculated as the 
difference in accuracy (percent correct) between valid and invalid cues, with 
positive values indicating a benefit for validly cued locations. The magnitude 
the distortion in perceived probe location was calculated as the difference in 
the average perceived probe location for the right cue and left cue conditions. 
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previous reports have shown a perceptual repulsion away from the locus of attention (e.g., 
Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1997; Pratt & Turk-Browne, 2003; Pratt, & Arnott, 2008; see also 
Bocianski, Müsseler, & Erlhagen, 2008, 2010; Fortenbaugh & Robertson, 2011). 
However, the details of our paradigm differed in many ways from those of these other 
studies. An exploration of the differences that lead to either a perceptual repulsion or 
attraction would be a worthy endeavor. 
Although the mislocalizations seen in Experiment 2 are reliable, they are very 
different in magnitude and direction than the mislocalizations typically obtained with the 
induced Roelofs effect, in which observers report the probe as being shifted in a direction 
opposite that of the offset frame that induces the effect. The mislocalization caused by 
endogenous shifts of attention, then, provide evidence against the general hypotheses that 
shifts of attention serve to distort the observer’s apparent midline, and that the Roelofs 
effect is driven by a reorienting of attention toward the center of the inducing frame. It 
may be, though, that important differences exist in the way that the apparent midline is 
affected by exogenous and endogenous shifts of attention, with the apparent midline 
susceptible to distortions caused by exogenous but not endogenous shifts. Indeed, if the 
Roelofs-inducing frame causes a reorienting of attention, it is of an exogenous nature. 
Further, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with, but do not definitively support, 
the idea that exogenous shifts of attention lead to a distortion of apparent midline. 
Experiment 3 attempts to eliminate the confounds that existed in Experiment 1 in order to 
more precisely measure the effects of both an exogenous reorienting of attention and the 
imbalanced visual display inherent in the Roelofs effect. 
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Experiment 3 
This series of experiments was undertaken to test the hypothesis that the distortion of 
the observer’s midline that underlies the Roelofs effect is caused by a shift of attention to 
the center of the offset inducing frame. While Experiment 1 demonstrated that a small 
exogenous attentional cue does indeed induce a Roelofs-like effect, Experiment 2 
suggested that it was not attentional shifts per se that cause the effect. However, since 
Experiment 1 tested the effects of an exogenous cue and Experiment 2 tested the effects 
of an endogenous one, it could be that the difference in outcomes points to differences in 
the effects of exogenous versus endogenous shifts of attention, with only exogenous 
shifts able to cause a bias in the apparent midline. Therefore, we have not yet established 
whether the Roelofs effect is driven directly by the visual field asymmetry that is inherent 
in the offset inducing frame, or instead due to the resulting attentional shift that such an 
asymmetry might evoke. To distinguish between these possibilities, it is necessary to 
devise a paradigm that successfully dissociates the visual field asymmetry from the 
resulting shift of attention that might occur.  
In Experiment 3, a visual field asymmetry was created by presenting to participants 
an array of 8 circles that was offset to the left or right of straight ahead (Figure 14). 
Although this offset array is somewhat different than the typical Roelofs-inducing 
rectangular frame, it is expected that the resulting asymmetry in the visual field will still 
be capable of causing a Roelofs effect when participants attempt to determine the 
location of a visual probe presented below the array. In a letter identification task, 
participants were instructed to report the identity of a letter that was a specific color (e.g., 
red). The letter always appeared inside one of two possible circles in the offset array. On 
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some trials, the spatial position of the letter was preceded by a non-predictive cue that 
matched the color of the letter (e.g., one red circle in the offset array). Previous work has 
demonstrated involuntary attentional capture to the location of this type of irrelevant cue, 
because the color of the cue matches the observer’s attentional settings (Folk et al., 1992; 
Folk & Remington, 1999; Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002, 2008; Folk & Remington, 2006). 
If this type of color-contingent exogenous shift of attention can override the attention 
grabbing effects of the offset array of circles, we predict that the perceived location of the  
visual probe should be modulated by the location of the colored cue. Alternatively, if the 
Roelofs effect is driven directly by sensory imbalances in the visual field and is therefore 
unaffected by shifts of attention, we would predict no effect of the cue – instead, the 
probe’s perceived location should be modulated by the location of the offset array of 
circles.    
 
Methods 
Participants.  Eighteen University of Oregon undergraduates with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision volunteered to participate for course credit.  Participants 
provided informed consent prior to their participation, with all procedures approved by 
the Institutional Review Board of the University of Oregon. 
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to that of Experiments 1 & 2. 
Localization training. Participants first completed the identical localization training 
procedure described in the previous experiments, except the probe was positioned 
approximately 11° below fixation. Average accuracy was significantly greater than 
chance (M = 81.78% correct, SE = 1.89; t(17) = 15.98, p < .0001). 
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Experimental procedure. Participants completed 20 practice trials and 252 
experimental trials. Participants were instructed that there would be two tasks in the 
experiment; a letter identification task (comprising 144 of the 252 trials) and a probe 
localization task (108 trials). Participants never had to perform both tasks in a single trial; 
they were told the two tasks would be randomized throughout the experiment, with no 
prior warning to indicate which trial type to expect. In the letter identification task, 
participants were asked to report the identity of a target letter (an E or H) that would 
Figure 14: Example of a valid array – invalid cue trial in the identification task 
from Experiment 3. The fixation point (not shown) was presented at eye-level, 
centered on the participant’s objective midline. The observer was always 
positioned roughly halfway between the two possible target letter locations. The 
array of circles shifted (left or right) around those positions throughout the 
experiment. In the localization task (not shown), the target and distractor letters 
and masks did not appear; instead, a small visual probe appeared below the array. 
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appear simultaneously with a figure-8 distractor, with the letter always of one color  (the 
target color, red or green, counterbalanced across subjects) and the distractor always of 
another (the distractor color, green or red). In addition, they were told that the target letter 
could appear inside either of two colored circles (one red, the other green), and that the 
color of the circles were not predictive of the letter position or its identity. For the 
remaining localization trials, participants were told that the letter would not appear, but 
would be replaced by a visual probe whose position should be reported just as it had been 
in the earlier localization training procedure. 
Every trial began with the presentation of a central fixation point (white, 1° diameter) 
in the center of the screen. Participants initiated the trial by moving the eyes to the 
fixation point, and then pressing the spacebar on a keyboard with the left hand. After 250 
ms, an array of horizontally arranged circles (n = 8, each 5.4° in diameter, with a stroke 
width of 0.3°) was then presented 5.5° below fixation (Figure 14). The circles were 
displaced laterally 8.3° from one another, on average, with an additional jitter factor in 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions (±0.06 to 1.1°, randomly selected each trial) so as 
to preclude their use as stable allocentric cues across trials. The entire array subtended 
approximately 63°, with the center of the array offset 14° to the left or right of objective 
midline, such that the majority of the circles fell in one visual hemifield on any given trial. 
On a minority of trials (96 of 252 trials), all circles in the array were white; in the 
remaining trials (156 trials), circles in the array were white, with the exception of one that 
was of the target color and one that was of the distractor color. When they appeared, the 
two colored circles were always in the array positions immediately flanking the 
participant’s objective midline, and were not jittered in their positions (however, the 
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constant change in the locations of the other circles, and in the entire array, gave the 
strong subjective impression that these colored circles were also jittered). It was expected 
that the circle having the target color would act as an exogenous cue that attracted the 
participant’s attention, since its color matched that of the target letter for which the 
participant was searching. 
Letter identification trials. After the circle array was presented (150 ms SOA), a 
target letter (E or H, 2.7° by 4.2°, of the target color) appeared inside one of the circles 
that flanked the participant’s objective midline. A single non-target figure-8 distractor 
(2.7° by 4.2°, in the distractor color) was presented in the corresponding circle in the 
other hemifield. After 75 ms, both the target letter and distractor were extinguished, 
followed after a 25 ms ISI by the presentation of two figure-8 masks (16 ms duration). 
Subsequently, all stimuli were extinguished, and participants ended the trial by pressing 
one of two keys with the left hand to indicate the identity of the target letter (“x” with 
their index finger if the letter was an H, “z” with their middle finger if the letter was an E). 
After a 500 ms intertrial interval, the fixation point reappeared and participants were free 
to begin the next trial. 
For the identification trials, trials were categorized according to whether the circle 
array and cue circle locations were consistent with the location of the target letter. Trials 
in which the target letter appeared inside the circle with the matching color (i.e., both 
were of the target color) were categorized as valid cue trials. Invalid cue trials were those 
in which the target letter appeared in the circle with the distractor color. Neutral cue trials 
contained no colored circles; that is, all the circles were a uniform white. Similarly, trials 
in which the circle array was offset to the same side as the target letter (e.g., both were to 
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the right of fixation) were categorized as valid array trials. Trials in which the circle array 
was offset in the direction opposite the target letter were considered invalid array trials. 
Probe localization trials. Localization trials began in the same manner as the 
identification trials, and were identical through the presentation of the circle array. 
However, after a 150 ms SOA from array onset, a localization probe (0.5° diameter, 75 
ms duration, with the same color as the target letter in the identification trials) was 
presented instead of a target letter. The probe appeared 11° below fixation, randomly in 
one of the central three possible probe positions learned earlier in the localization training 
(-1.5°, 0°, or 1.5° from participant’s midline). After the probe was extinguished, 
participants pressed one of five buttons with the right hand to indicate the perceived 
position of the probe. After a 500 ms intertrial interval, the fixation point reappeared and 
participants were free to begin the next trial. 
In the localization trials, trials were categorized according the locations of the circle 
array (right array or left array) and the location of the circle with the target color (right 
cue, left cue or neutral cue). 
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Results 
In an assessment of letter identification accuracy, a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
factors of cue and array validity revealed a significant main effect (F(2, 34) = 5.95, p 
= .006, η2 = .849) of cue validity. In contrast, there was no significant effect of array 
validity (F(1, 17) = .04, p = .843, η2 = .054), and the interaction between cue and array 
validity also did not reach significance (F(2, 34) = 1.58, p = .221, η2 = .311). Because the 
factor of array validity had no significant effect on identification accuracy, we collapsed 
across this factor in subsequent analyses. Accuracy (Figure 15) in the valid color cue 
condition (M = 81.3%, SE = 3.0; t(17) = 3.30, p = .004) was significantly greater than in 
the invalid cue condition (M = 74.2%, SE = 2.7), and marginally greater than in the 
Figure 15: Percent correct in the identification task of 
Experiment 3. Errors bars represent standard error estimates for 
each cue condition. 
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neutral cue condition (M = 76.9%, SE = 2.8; t(17) = 2.09, p = .052). The difference 
between the invalid and neutral cue conditions did not significantly differ (t(17) = -1.39, 
p = .183).  
 
 
We performed a separate multiple regression analysis of the probe localization trials 
(Figure 16), with the factors of probe position, array location, and cue location entered in 
a block-wise fashion (in that order). Not surprisingly, the factor of probe location had the 
greatest effect on the perceived location of the probe (R2 = .357, ß = .597, t(1942) = 34.59, 
p < .0001). In addition, array location significantly affected the perceived location of the 
probe (R2 = .064, ß = -.253, t(1941) = -14.66, p < .0001). The mean reported difference in 
Figure 16: Perceived probe location in the localization task of Experiment 3, 
plotted with respect to the actual probe location (negative values indicate locations 
to the left of fixation). Data is plotted separately for the different combinations of 
cue and array locations. Data from the neutral cue conditions are obscured by data 
from the left cue and right cue conditions within each of the array conditions. 
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the location of the probe, across the three cue conditions (array right – array left 
conditions) was 0.61°, with probes reported in the opposite direction as the shifted array 
(Figure 16). However, the factor of cue location had no significant effect on the reports of 
probe location (R2 < .0001, ß = -.009, t(1940) = -.545, p = .586). 
 
Discussion 
In letter identification task of Experiment 3, accuracy was significantly affected by 
the location of the target-colored circle that preceded the presentation of the target letter. 
If this cue validly indicated the subsequent target letter location, accuracy increased. This 
finding demonstrated that the manipulation of attentional set effectively captured 
attention, drawing the locus of attention toward the cue that shared the target’s color. 
Importantly, accuracy was unaffected by the location of the circle array, indicating that 
the color-contingent manipulation of attention was effective at overriding any attentional 
attraction that the offset array might of otherwise had. 
While the letter identification accuracy was affected by the location of the color cue 
and not the location of the circle array, there was an opposite pattern of performance in 
the probe localization task. Specifically, the perceived location of the probe was 
modulated by the location of the offset circle array, but not by the location of the color 
cue. The bias in localization caused by the offset array mirrored the typical Roelofs effect, 
with the probe’s location reported to be shifted in the direction opposite the array offset. 
The fact that the probe localization was unaffected by the exogenous shift of attention 
aimed at the color cue indicates that reflexive shifts of attention do not cause a distortion 
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of the observer’s apparent midline, and therefore must not serve as the mechanism that 
drives the Roelofs effect.  
 
General Discussion 
In three experiments we examined the affect of orienting visuospatial attention on 
observers’ perception of spatial location.  Experiment 1 demonstrated that non-predictive 
exogenous cues are capable of causing a Roelofs-like effect, demonstrating that the 
Roelofs effect is not dependent on the use of the typical large inducing frame. However, 
the results of Experiment 1 did not conclusively demonstrate that it was a shift of 
attention that caused the distortion, since the imbalanced visual display might have been 
sufficient enough to drive the distortion independent of any shift in the locus of spatial 
attention.  Experiments 2 used a central endogenous cue that prompted a shift of attention 
without the use of an imbalanced visual display. The resulting endogenous shift of 
attention was found to be capable of inducing a distortion of the perceived location of a 
visual probe, but this distortion was clearly different (much smaller in magnitude, and in 
the opposite direction) from the typical Roelofs effect. Finally, the paradigm of 
Experiment 3 used a color-contingent attentional manipulation to successfully dissociate 
a shift in attention from an imbalance in the visual display. The results provide clear 
evidence that it is the imbalance of the visual display and not any accompanying shift of 
attention that drives the Roelofs effect. 
Comparing the results of Experiments 2 and 3 seems to indicate a difference in the 
effects of endogenous and exogenous shifts of attention on perceived space, with 
exogenous shifts causing no distortion in the perceived location of a visual probe while 
endogenous shifts cause the probe’s perceived location to be attracted to the new locus of 
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attention. (Experiment 1 is of little value in this comparison, since any effect of the 
exogenous shift of attention was confounded by the Roelofs effect driven by the 
imbalanced display.) We offer three possibilities for this discrepancy. First, it is possible 
that neither type of attentional shift causes a distortion of the perceived probe location, 
and the apparent distortion seen in Experiment 2 is simply a type I statistical error. 
However, while the effect is quite small, we have replicated it several times in the lab, 
using variations of the paradigm presented here in Experiment 2 (unpublished 
observations). Furthermore, an examination of the individual differences in performance 
in the identification and localization tasks in Experiment 2 revealed that the magnitude of 
the distortion in the localization task was proportional to the magnitude of the validity 
effect in the identification task, a relationship that would not be expected if the apparent 
distortion in the localization task was merely a type I error. For these reasons, we do 
believe that the distorting effect of endogenous shifts of attention is real. 
Second, it is possible that exogenous shifts of attention cause a distortion similar to 
that of endogenous shift, but the perceptual consequences were not detected in 
Experiment 3 due to a type II statistical error. Indeed, the effect would be expected to be 
quite small, using the effect seen with the endogenous shift in Experiment 2 as a guide, 
and it may have been overpowered by the much larger Roelofs effect caused by the offset 
array of circles. 
Third, it may be that exogenous and endogenous shifts of attention really do differ in 
their abilities to cause distortions of the perceived probe location. Exogenous and 
endogenous shifts of attention are similar in a variety of ways; for example, there is 
partial functional overlap in the brain regions that control reflexive and voluntary shifts 
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of attention (Corbetta et al., 1993, 1995; Anderson et al., 1994; Nobre et al., 1998; 
Gitelman et al., 1996). However, they also differ in many respects. While early imaging 
studies provided evidence for broad overlap between cortical circuits involved in 
voluntary and reflexive shifts of attention, recent studies have demonstrated that distinct 
sub-regions of posterior parietal cortex are transiently active during voluntary vs. 
reflexive attentional shifts (Serences et al., 2005; Serences & Yantis, 2006). Reflexive 
and voluntary shifts of attention also differ prominently in their time courses (Müller & 
Rabbitt, 1989; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Klein, 2000), and their perceptual consequences 
(Yeshurun, Montagna, & Carrasco, 2008). Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park (2005) have 
suggested that endogenous and exogenous manipulations of attention likely affect 
different stages of processing, proposing that endogenous shifts of attention affect 
perceptual representations, while exogenous shifts of attention influence decision-level 
stages of processing. If this distinction is true, it could provide a basis for the difference 
in the spatial distortions that can be attributed to the two.   
Although the results presented here indicate that the Roelofs effect is caused by an 
imbalance between the left and right visual fields independent of any shifts of attention, it 
remains to be determined how the imbalance causes the underlying distortion of the 
observer’s apparent midline. One possibility is that the visual system uses the middle of 
the full extent of the visual field as a cue to form a representation of the direction that the 
head is facing, for use as the origin for an egocentric reference frame. This visual cue 
would not be used exclusively, since it is clear that vestibular and proprioceptive cues 
would also contribute (as evidence by the fact that observers are still capable of making 
egocentric judgments about a object’s location even when that object is perceived in 
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otherwise complete darkness). Under normal viewing conditions, the visual field is 
reliably symmetrical around the observer’s objective midline, and would serve as a useful 
cue to form veridical representations of straight-ahead. However, this cue would prove to 
be less reliable when the observer is in an impoverished visual environment, when 
imbalances in the visual field would become more prominent, resulting in the Roelofs 
effect. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RIGHT SUPERIOR PARIETAL LOBULE IS A SELECTIVE PROCESSOR OF 
EGOCENTRIC CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION 
 
When an observer makes a judgment about an object’s spatial attributes, such as 
location, orientation or size, the specific attribute is not considered in isolation, but is 
instead judged within the context provided by the entire visual scene. Depth cues, for 
example, provide information about the distance between the observer and the object of 
interest, which in turn allows for an appropriate use of the object’s retinal size as a cue in 
the assessment of its actual size (Gregory, 1963). Similarly, when attempting to determine 
the orientation of an object, the edges of building walls, doors, etc., can provide visual 
cues of the observer’s own orientation in space so that deviations from a normal upright 
posture can be taken into account (Asch & Witkin, 1948). While this use of egocentric 
visuospatial context is typically beneficial to the observer’s judgment, misleading 
contextual information can lead to illusions, with, for example, the well-known Ponzo 
and rod-and-frame (Fig. 1A) illusions driven by distortions of perceived depth and 
orientation, respectively.  
 
Experiment 1 
Recent imaging work has demonstrated that egocentric contextual information from 
the Ponzo illusion can modulate perception through the effects of feedback connections 
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from higher levels of visual processing to earlier levels, such as area V1 (Murray, Boyaci, 
& Kersten, 2006; Fang et al., 2008). However, the anatomical origin of this feedback 
signal remains a mystery. Walter & Dassonville  (2008) used fMRI to explore the cortical 
regions involved in processing the contextual information that leads to the induced 
Roelofs effect, an illusory shift in the perceived location of a target induced by an 
underlying distortion of the observer’s perception of straight-ahead  (Bridgeman, Peery, 
& Anand, 1997; Dassonville & Bala, 2004a; Dassonville et al., 2004). A greater 
activation was observed in the superior parietal lobule (SPL), predominantly in the right 
hemisphere, when participants made location judgments within the illusion-inducing 
context, compared to trials in which the same judgment was made with targets presented 
in isolation.  
Although these results suggest that right SPL plays a role in processing the contextual 
cues that contribute to our perception of visual space, another possibility must be 
acknowledged. When viewing an illusory stimulus, the observer often understands that 
the visuospatial context is misleading and should therefore be ignored in order to achieve 
optimal performance in the task. The activation in right SPL observed by Walter & 
Dassonville (2008) may therefore reflect an active attempt by the observer to suppress the 
contextual information, in an attempt to mitigate its illusory effects. To test these 
alternatives, we used slow repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to 
temporarily disrupt the processing of this parietal region in healthy observers. If right 
SPL plays a direct role in processing egocentric contextual information, rTMS should 
cause a decrease in illusion susceptibility. Alternatively, if right SPL plays a role in 
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suppressing the effects of misleading contextual information, one would expect an 
increase in illusion susceptibility after rTMS. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Participants (n = 12, 3 female, ages 18 – 34) gave their informed, 
written consent to participate in the study, as per the Institutional Review Board of the 
University of Oregon. 
Anatomical scans. Each participant completed an initial magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) session to collect anatomical scans for use in guiding the transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). T1-weighted images were acquired at the Lewis Center for 
Neuroimaging at the University of Oregon. MR images were acquired using a 3T head-
only MRI scanner (Siemens Magnetom Allegra, Erlangen, Germany), with a phased array 
head-coil and a standard MPRAGE sequence (TR = 2.5 s, TE = 4.38 ms, TI = 1.1 s, 176 
slices, 1 mm thickness, 0 mm gap, FOV = 256 x 256 x 100 mm), yielding an in-plane 
anatomical resolution of 1 x 1 x 1 mm. To ensure that the laterality of the images would 
be correctly interpreted, participants were scanned with a small marker (0.5 ml centrifuge 
tube filled with a nickel sulfate solution) taped to the right side of the forehead. 
Anatomical registration. Following completion of the anatomical scan, the image of 
each participant’s brain was warped to a common MNI space using Brainsight 
neuronavigation software (Rogue Research Inc.). This transformation was performed by 
demarcating the AC/PC line in the individual scans; a bounding box was then adjusted to 
encompass the entire cortex. Four external anatomical references (the tip of the nose, the 
bridge of the nose, and right and left tragal notches) were registered in each individual’s 
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scan for use in guiding the stimulator in subsequent TMS sessions. The Talaraich 
coordinates corresponding to the BOLD activations observed by Walter and Dassonville 
(2008) were used to delineate target sites in the left and right superior parietal lobules 
(MNI: -14, -68, 57 and 19, -66, 57, respectively) after first converting to MNI coordinates 
(Lancaster et al., 2007). The vertex was identified as the midline location on the scalp 
halfway between the nasion and inion  (MNI: 0, -15, 90, on average).  
TMS sessions. Each experiment consisted of three TMS sessions separated by a 
minimum of one week. In each session, a single cortical site (right SPL, left SPL or 
vertex) was stimulated, with site order counterbalanced across participants in both 
experiments. Each session began with a pre-TMS baseline run of the experimental task 
(see Experimental Task section, below), lasting approximately 10-15 minutes. 
 The motor hot spot was identified in individual participants by determining the 
cortical region at which single TMS pulses (delivered via a 70-mm figure-eight coil 
connected to a MagStim Rapid stimulator) could evoke visible movements of the index 
finger and thumb of the dominant hand. The strength of the magnetic pulse was slowly 
reduced to the smallest value at which visible movements could still be observed. The 
strength of the magnetic pulse during the subsequent experimental TMS session was then 
set to 110% of this resting motor threshold.  
Participants were seated comfortably, with a chin rest stabilizing the head. Using the 
Brainsight frameless stereotaxic system, the anatomic reference frame was calibrated for 
individual participants, using the tip of the nose, the bridge of the nose and tragal notches 
as landmarks. The magnetic coil was subsequently guided to the appropriate cortical 
region of interest and locked into place using an adjustable arm. The position of the coil 
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was monitored on-line by the experimenter, with the coil never deviating more than two 
mm from the target anatomical site. Ten minutes of low-frequency (1-Hz) repetitive TMS 
(rTMS) were then administered, with the pulses controlled by LabView (National 
Instruments) experimental software. Recent work examining the effects of TMS on 
cortical excitability show that low-frequency rTMS reduces cortical excitability, 
effectively inhibiting the underlying neural tissue for several minutes (Fitzgerald, 
Fountain, & Daskalakis, 2006; Maeda et al., 2000). After the 10 min stimulation period, 
participants promptly completed a post-TMS run of the experimental task.   
  
Stimuli and Procedure 
Rod-and-frame illusion (RFI). Stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor operating at 
a resolution of 1024 x 768 (refresh rate = 60-Hz). To remove any environmental (i.e., 
allocentric) cues that might aid the participants in their task, the brightness and contrast 
of the monitor were reduced so that the edges of the screen were not visible. In addition, 
the monitor was placed within a large wooden box (painted black), with a blackout 
curtain draped over the open end. Participants viewed the monitor from 24 inches away, 
with the blackout curtains draped over their head and shoulders to prevent stray light 
from providing cues.  
At the beginning of the first TMS session, participants completed 16 practice trials of 
the RFI task (see Figure 17A). Each trial began with a centrally presented fixation point 
(.5° in diameter). Participants pressed the spacebar on a keyboard to begin each trial. 
After a 200 ms delay, a tilted rod (0.17° wide and 4.8° long) was presented for 500 ms, 
centered on the fixation point. The rod was oriented -6, -4, -2, -1, 1, 2, 4, or 6° from 
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vertical, with negative values indicating leftward tilts. Participants reported whether the 
top of rod was tilted right or left by pressing one of two keys (J or F) on the keyboard. 
Feedback was then presented for 500 ms, indicating the correct response (i.e., “right” or 
“left”). 
Following the practice block, participants completed 270 experimental trials. Each 
trial began with a central fixation point (0.5° in diameter). Participants initiated a trial by 
pressing the spacebar. In a portion of the trials (n = 180), a large tilted frame (with each 
edge subtending 19° of visual angle, tilted 15° to the left or right of gravitational vertical) 
was then presented for 400 ms. After a delay of 300 ms from frame onset, a tilted rod (-6, 
-4, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 4, or 6° from gravitational vertical) was flashed for 100 ms, with the 
frame and rod extinguished simultaneously. The remaining 90 trials were identical, 
except that the rod was presented in isolation (that is, no frame was presented). As in the 
practice trials, participants ended the trial by reporting the orientation of the rod with a 
keypress. Trials with and without the frame were presented in random order, and no 
feedback on performance was provided to the participants. 
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Data analysis. For each combination of rod and frame tilt in the RFI trials, the 
perceived location of the rod was quantified as the proportion of trials in which the 
participant reported the central stimulus as being oriented to the right of gravitational 
vertical (Figure 18A). Psychometric functions were then fit (Microsoft Excel, using a 
least-squares algorithm) to this data to determine the point of subjective equality (PSE, 
the orientation at which the rod was equally likely to be judged as being tilted left or right 
of vertical), using the equation: 
 proportion “Right” responses = e((rodtilt–PSE)/tau)/(1+e((rodtilt–PSE)/tau))),  
Figure 17: Experimental tasks. A) Visual display for evoking the rod-and-frame 
illusion (Experiment 1), in which a square frame tilted away from gravitational 
vertical distorts an individual’s perception of subjective vertical (dashed line, not 
seen by observer). When the observer assesses the rod’s orientation, the biased 
perception of vertical typically causes the rod to appear to be tilted in a direction 
opposite the frame. B) Visual display for evoking the simultaneous-tilt illusion 
(Experiment 2). The tilt of the grating in the outer annulus causes a repulsion of 
the perceived orientation of the central array due to local contrast effects in early 
visual processing, without distorting subjective vertical (dashed line). 
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where rodtilt was the orientation of the rod, PSE was the point of subjective equality, and 
tau was the rate of change of the psychometric function. To quantify the magnitude of the 
illusion, the PSE for the left-tilt condition was subtracted from that of the right-tilt 
condition, with this total effect size statistically compared across conditions.  
In Experiment 1, participants (n = 12) reported the orientation of the rod in a version 
of the rod-and-frame illusion (Figure 17A; Witkin & Asch, 1948), with illusion 
susceptibility quantified as the difference between the point of subject equality (PSE, the 
orientation at which participants reported the rod as being tilted clockwise and 
counterclockwise with equal probability) for left- and right-tilted frames (Figure 18A). 
Participants completed a baseline block of RFI trials, followed by 10 minutes of 1-Hz 
rTMS, and then a final RFI block to assess the effects of the stimulation. Three regions of 
interest were targeted with rTMS in separate sessions: right SPL, and two control sites – a 
mirror site in left SPL and vertex.    
 
Results 
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction (P = 0.02, d.f. 2, 22) 
between stimulation site and block, (pre- vs. post-TMS), with no significant main effects. 
A significant decrease in illusion susceptibility was found following right SPL 
stimulation (Figure 18B), compared to vertex (P = 0.04) and left SPL (P = 0.01), 
suggesting that right SPL plays a role in processing the egocentric contextual information 
provided by the tilted frame. The slopes of the psychometric functions (a measure of task  
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Figure 18: Results of Experiments 1 & 2. A) Average results from the right SPL 
stimulation site in Experiment 1, showing the proportion of trials in which each 
rod orientation was reported to be rotated clockwise from vertical. Best-fit 
psychometric functions are shown for each frame tilt (i.e., left and right) in both 
pre- and post-TMS blocks. The point at which each function surpasses a 
proportion of 0.5 indicates the point of subjective equality (PSE) for that 
condition, with illusion susceptibility in each block assessed as the difference in 
PSE for right- and left-tilted frames. B) Total change in rod-and-frame 
susceptibility (pre- minus post-TMS) for each cortical region of interest in 
Experiment 1. TMS at only the right SPL site caused a significant change in 
illusion susceptibility, a decrease of 0.54 deg from the mean pre-TMS illusion 
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difficulty) did not significantly change after TMS (P’s > 0.10), ruling out the possibility 
that TMS simply minimized the distracting influence of the frame. In addition, there were 
no significant changes in illusion susceptibility or task difficulty for any stimulation site 
(P’s > 0.11) during trials in which the rod was presented in isolation (i.e., with no 
accompanying frame), indicating that the effects of TMS acted specifically to modulate 
the participants’ use of the egocentric contextual information provided by the frame.  
 
Experiment 2 
If right SPL is a selective processor of egocentric context, susceptibility should be 
unaffected in illusions in which the inducing context affects early, local levels of visual 
processing, as in the simultaneous-tilt illusion (Figure 17B; Gibson & Radner, 1937). In 
Experiment 2, participants completed a version of the simultaneous-tilt illusion in an 
rTMS paradigm otherwise identical to that of Experiment 1. 
 
Methods 
Participants. The same participants as Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. 
 
Procedure and apparatus 
Simultaneous tilt illusion (STI). The apparatus was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
At the beginning of the first TMS session, participants completed 16 practice trials of the 
STI task (see Figure 18B). Each trial began with a centrally presented fixation point (0.5° 
in diameter). Participants pressed the spacebar to begin each trial. After a 200 ms delay, a 
circular patch of a tilted grating (3.2° of visual angle in diameter) was presented for 500 
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ms, centered on the fixation point. Across the grating, red and black bars (0.26° in width) 
alternated in a square wave pattern. The grating was tilted -5, -3, -1, 1, 3, or 5° from 
vertical, with negative values indicating leftward tilts. Participants reported whether the 
grating was tilted right or left by pressing one of two keys (J or F) on the keyboard. 
Feedback was then presented for 500 ms, indicating the correct response (i.e., “right” or 
“left”). 
Following the practice block, participants completed 210 experimental trials. Each 
trial began with a central fixation point (0.5° in diameter). Participants initiated a trial by 
pressing the spacebar. In a portion of the trials (n = 140), an outer annulus of oriented 
bars (5° outer diameter, 3.2° inner diameter, with red and black bars of 0.26° in width 
alternating in a square wave pattern, tilted 15° to the left or right of gravitational vertical) 
was presented for 700 ms. After a delay of 200 ms from annulus onset, the inner grating 
(tilted -4, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, or 4° from gravitational vertical), with the annulus and inner 
grating extinguished simultaneously. The remaining 70 trials were identical, except that 
the inner grating was presented in isolation (that is, no outer annulus was presented). As 
in the practice trials, participants ended the trial by reporting the orientation of the inner 
grating. Trials with and without the inner grating were presented in random order, and no 
feedback on performance was provided to the participants. 
Results 
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions 
(P’s > 0.30; Figure 18C), suggesting that the effects of rTMS on right SPL are specific to 
the use of egocentric contextual information. 
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General Discussion 
The results of the present study go beyond those of a previous imaging study that 
demonstrated right SPL to be activated during a localization task in which observers are 
influenced by egocentric contextual information (Walter & Dassonville, 2008). Here, the 
use of rTMS allows for an examination of the causal relationship between this activation 
and subsequent perception, with the finding that right SPL participates directly in the 
processing of egocentric context in the formation of visual representations of space. The 
lateralization of this function is not surprising given previous research demonstrating the 
right hemisphere’s role in processing visual information at a global level (Han et al., 
2002; Volberg & Hubner, 2007), and making location judgments within an egocentric 
reference frame (Walter & Dassonville, 2008). Given these findings, right SPL should be 
considered a viable candidate for the origin of the feedback signal that provides a 
modulatory effect on neural activity in early visual areas according to the egocentric 
context provided by the visual scene (Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006).  
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CHAPTER V 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation has focused on how environmental cues interact with visuospatial 
attention in the creation and maintenance of egocentric reference frames. As an observer 
navigates the visual world, objects and landmarks can be encoded in a variety of 
reference frames. They may be encoded egocentrically, for example, relative to the 
position of the eyes in their orbits, or relative to the orientation of the trunk. Objects are 
also localized relative to one another, in allocentric (world-centered) coordinates. The 
redundancies inherent in these multiple coordinate systems provide a means of increasing 
the accuracy and precision of perceptual and cognitive judgments, and they provide 
flexibility when an observer must navigate and interact with the world.  
In our day-to-day interactions with the environment, it is difficult to dissociate the 
characteristics of the egocentric and allocentric reference frames. However, it is possible 
to isolate the reference frames through the use of experimental manipulations that provide 
impoverished visual cues, effectively limiting the number and types of cues available. In 
the paradigms used in Chapters II and III, for example, participants were first asked to 
learn the locations of individual probes that were presented in complete darkness, with no 
other visual stimuli that could provide cues to their locations within an allocentric 
coordinate system. Thus, the probes’ locations are learned in an egocentric reference 
frame, and subsequent distortions of that egocentric reference frame (that is, distortions 
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of the apparent midline) by an imbalanced visual display led to mislocalizations of the 
visual probes. Likewise, the paradigm of Chapter IV caused distortions of the egocentric 
reference frame (specifically, distortions of perceived vertical) through the use of the rod-
and-frame illusion.  
 
Attentional set and the induced Roelofs effect 
Visual context can operate at multiple levels of the visual processing hierarchy. One 
way to understand the visual processing responsible for a visual illusion is to delineate 
the specific level in the processing hierarchy that is involved. In an extreme example, it 
has been shown that contextual information can influence perception even in the absence 
of awareness (Bridgeman & Lathrop, 2007; Moore & Egeth, 1997; Chan & Chua, 2003; 
Lamy, Segal, & Ruderman, 2006). On the other hand, illusory effects can also be 
modulated by top-down processes, as when they are minimized by explicitly instructing 
participants to ignore the context (Coren & Porac, 1983; Goryo, Robinson, & Wilson, 
1984; Tsal, 1984; Predebon, 2004, 2006).  
The paradigm of Chapter II was designed to test whether feature-based attentional 
settings might interact with the bottom-up processing of the visual context provided by a 
Roelofs-inducing frame. The results were consistent with the larger attentional capture 
literature, demonstrating that distractor items (in this case, the Roelofs-inducing frame) 
are most disruptive when they have featural overlap with task-relevant targets (Folk et al., 
1992; Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk et al., 2002, 2008). The studies presented in Chapter II 
demonstrate that the induced Roelofs effect can be modulated by attentional control 
settings. Importantly, these findings cannot be attributed to low-level perceptual grouping 
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effects. When the frame matched the task-relevant target color, an exaggerated distortion 
of midline was observed. Attentional control settings, and their affect on attentional 
capture have traditionally been studied at relatively high levels of cognitive functioning 
(e.g., visual search) (Leber & Egeth, 2006). The results demonstrate that attentional set is 
also capable of modulating the visual system’s weighting of low-level egocentric 
contextual information.  
 
Locus of attention and subjective midline 
Early work examining the effects of attention on localization abilities demonstrated 
that spatial localization of a target item becomes more variable when covert attention is 
shifted to another location (Newby & Rock, 2001; Tsal, 1999; Tsal & Bareket, 1999; 
Butler, 1980). In addition, clinical evidence exists that suggests the current locus of 
spatial attention can act as an egocentric reference frame (McCloskey & Rapp, 2000).  
In the induced Roelofs task, the rectangular frame is a very large and salient object 
and it is typically the only visual reference available to the observer. Chapter III 
presented the hypothesis that these characteristics of the Roelofs-inducing frame cause it 
to reflexively capture attention, and it is this shift of attention that triggers a concomitant 
shift in subjective midline (additional evidence for this idea is provided by previous work 
showing that a small peripheral distractor is sufficient to cause a distortion of subjective 
midline; Walter & Dassonville, unpublished observations). The Roelofs effect has been 
observed when the frame is visible for prolonged periods of time, demonstrating that 
shifts of attention and subjective midline are not invariably yoked (Roelofs, 1934). 
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However, transient frame presentations may attract attention (and, with it, the apparent 
midline) because no external visual information is present to anchor subjective midline.  
In Chapter III, this hypothesis was tested using modified versions of a spatial cueing 
task (Posner, 1980a, 1980b). Exogenous (reflexive) cues showed a pattern of responses 
consistent with subjective midline shifting with the locus of attention (Experiment 1). An 
endogenous (predictive) cue was then used to control for physical imbalances in the 
visual field (Experiment 2). The pattern of results did not support the hypothesis that 
midline shifted with the locus of visuospatial attention. Experiment 3, which pitted a 
visual display that was imbalanced toward one hemifield with a shift of attention into the 
other hemifield, provided further evidence that shifts of attention do not cause the 
distortions of subjective midline associated with the Roelofs effect. The results of these 
studies support the conclusion that the Roelofs effect is driven not by shifts of attention, 
but instead by asymmetries in the visual field.  
Why, then, do these asymmetries cause a distortion in the apparent midline? The 
importance of symmetry across the visual field is consistent with the idea that the entire 
visual field acts as an environmental reference under normal circumstances. As an 
observer views the world in typical, well-lit conditions, the right and left hemifields form 
a complete visual field that is usually centered around the observer’s apparent midline. 
Under those conditions, the middle of the visual field would provide a useful cue to 
indicate straight ahead, which could be combined with proprioceptive and vestibular cues. 
In the Roelofs paradigm, on the other hand, the entire extent of the visual image is 
defined by the offset boundaries of the inducing frame, whose center would serve as a 
misleading cue for straight ahead.  
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Contextual processing in right superior parietal lobule 
Neurophysiological studies have demonstrated that posterior parietal regions 
represent the locations of objects  in the visual field within many different egocentric 
reference frames in a multiplexed fashion (Nitz, 2006; Rogers & Kesner, 2006; Brotchie 
et al., 1995; Crowe, Averbeck, & Chafee, 2008). The single-unit animal literature 
suggests that parietal cortex is critical in performing the computations required to create 
and maintain a representation (or representations) of personal and external space.  
Research in humans suggests a further dissociation in processing specificity between 
the parietal hemispheres. Several recent studies have demonstrated that the cerebral 
hemispheres differ in their sensitivity to global vs. local-level visual information (Hubner 
& Volberg, 2005; Hubner, Volberg, & Studer, 2007; Fink et al., 1996). Behavioral, 
hemodynamic, and electrophysiological studies, using hierarchical stimuli (e.g., a large 
letter S, composed of small E’s) all point to the right hemisphere acting as a selective 
processor of global contextual information.  
Relatively little research has examined how the hemispheres may differ in their 
processing of contextual information used for egocentric and allocentric spatial 
computations. Walter & Dassonville (2008) provided initial evidence that similar 
hemispheric differences exist when global contextual information is used in a localization 
judgment. They observed that a largely right-lateralized region of the superior parietal 
lobule was active when observers were judging the location of a target relative to midline, 
in the presence of illusion-inducing context. However, the exact function of the activation 
was unclear – it may have been that the rSPL was itself involved in processing the global 
context, thereby causing the distortion of subjective midline. On the other hand, it was 
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also conceivable that this activation reflected inhibitory operations that may have been 
part of the participants’ attempts to minimize the effects of the illusion. 
To dissociate these functions, the experiments of Chapter IV used 1-Hz repetitive 
TMS to temporarily suppress neural activity in the rSPL. Observers performed the rod-
and-frame task before and after TMS, allowing us to examine potential behavioral 
changes due to TMS. After TMS, observers were less susceptible to the effects of the 
illusion, indicating that the rSPL typically plays a role in processing the context provided 
by the rotated frame. Importantly, no effect of TMS was observed in the simultaneous tilt 
illusion, which is driven by mechanisms operating at a lower level of visual processing 
(i.e., primary visual cortex). These results coupled with previous fMRI findings (Walter 
& Dassonville, 2008) suggest that the rSPL is a selective processor of egocentric visual 
context.  
 
Future Directions 
These initial studies pose several interesting questions for future investigations. What 
is the potential role of feature priming in the attentional modulation of the Roelofs effect 
seen in Chapter II? Is the small but significant mislocalization observed in the 
endogenous cue experiment of Chapter III caused by a distortion of subjective midline, 
albeit one that is very different, and much smaller in magnitude, compared to that of the 
Roelofs effect? Is the region in right superior parietal lobule that is sensitive to the 
context provided by the Roelofs and rod-and-frame stimuli a domain-general processor of 
egocentric context? Finally, Chapter IV suggests that illusions of egocentric context and 
illusions of contrast can be dissociated at the neural level using TMS. If the context in the 
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rod-and-frame and simultaneous tilt are processed in separate areas of the visual system, 
would differences in the time course of these illusions also be observed? 
 
Filtering vs. priming in contingent capture 
The results of Chapter II were interpreted within a contingent capture framework of 
visual search. The original formulation of contingent capture argued that the creation of a 
top-down set selectively tuned the attentional system for specific target properties. 
Critically, it was assumed that non-relevant features are simply filtered out (Folk et al., 
1992). A contentious issue in the attentional capture literature has centered on the role of 
a top-down set under conditions of spatial uncertainty. Folk et al. (1992) argued that top-
down set affected the selection stage of processing, whereby stimuli sharing properties 
with the observer’s set are automatically selected. In contrast, recent work from 
Belopolsky, Schreif, & Theeuwes (2010; see also Lamy & Egeth, 2003; Lamy, Egeth, & 
Leber, 2004) suggests that attentional set facilitates search by suppressing non-relevant 
features, allowing for rapid disengagement from other salient irrelevant stimuli. The 
suppression hypothesis does not assume that ignored features cannot capture attention – 
salient distractors can capture attention –  but attention is rapidly disengaged because of 
the current attentional set. Thus, the role of an attentional set acts at the disengagement 
stage, rather than the attentional selection stage. The results of Chapter II could be 
interpreted as indicating that attention may have acted to decrease the salience of the non-
set frames causing them to have a smaller-than-normal effect on midline. Alternatively, 
non-set frames may have had a normal influence on midline, but the effect of the set-
matching frame was exacerbated because of the feature overlap with the target. Thus, our 
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results can be interpreted under either the selection or an inhibition hypothesis of 
contingent capture. The critical difference between the two is the stage of attentional 
selection in which the effect of the offset frame is modulated. 
 A particularly important question is the possible role of intertrial priming in the 
results of Chapter II. The original precueing studies asked participants to search for a 
target defined by a specific feature (e.g., a color or an onset) that was constant for the 
duration of the experiment (Folk et al., 1992, 1994). To prevent attentional capture by 
irrelevant singletons, the observers should actively maintain the attentional set on a trial-
by-trial basis. However, the active maintenance of a top-down template may not be 
necessary when the relevant feature is invariant across trials.  
Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) investigated an effect they termed priming of popout. 
They demonstrated that when participants had to search for a red target among green 
distractors (or vice versa), repeating a target (but not the response) facilitated search, 
even though the likelihood of a feature repetition was chance. Priming of popout was 
argued to be a form of automatic priming that is immune to top-down control. Maljkovic 
& Nakayama (1994) argued that the search facilitation is likely due to changes in low-
level feature weightings that operate throughout the entire search display (Kristjánsson, 
2002).  
In both experiments of Chapter II, participants were instructed to search for a target 
of a specific color. The relevant color was counter-balanced across subjects, but the 
relevant color did remain constant for each participant. The initial establishment of a top-
down set is critical for task performance, however visual selection during later stages of 
the experiment may be due to adjustments in the weights of the target and distractor 
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features, rather than active attentional filtering (Meeter & Olivers, 2006; Olivers & 
Humphreys, 2003; Olivers & Meeter, 2006). Adjusting feature weights could then guide 
visual selection in a bottom-up manner, allowing the maintenance of the attentional set to 
be abandoned.  
It is possible that both intertrial priming and top-down set played a role in 
Experiments 1 & 2 of Chapter II. The relative contributions of these two processes could 
be examined by cueing participants to adopt a specific attentional set (e.g., report blue) 
before each trial. This would require participants to rapidly reconfigure their attentional 
set on a trial-by-trial basis. If top-down set is involved, a capture effect should be 
replicated whenever the frame matches the current relevant target color. Critical trials 
would be those in which the set is switched, but the subsequent frame matches the 
previously abandoned attentional set. For example, assume after having previously 
searched for a red target in trial n-1, trial n required the observer to search for a blue 
target. Under these circumstances, intertrial priming would predict an exaggerated affect 
of a red frame on trial n due to the repetition of the feature that had been searched for in 
trial n-1. An intertrial priming account also predicts that the irrelevant frame should 
become more disruptive across repetitions because the weights will be adjusted over 
several trials.  
 
Attentional shifts and subjective midline 
The results of Chapter III demonstrate that the Roelofs effect is caused by visual field 
imbalances, and not spatial shifts of attention. An obvious question for future 
investigation is the nature of the target mislocalization observed with endogenous cues in 
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Experiment 2 of Chapter III. It can be reasonably concluded from the attentional cueing 
studies that the induced Roelofs effect is caused by low-level imbalances in the visual 
field (i.e., the lateralized peripheral cue); this asymmetry then serves to distort subjective 
midline, as was demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 3. However, the question remains, 
why was localization performance affected by endogenous shifts of attention, which 
caused the target to be perceived as being shifted toward the cued location (that is, with a 
leftward shift of attention, the target was perceived to be to the left of its actual position  -
- an effect in the opposite direction of the typical Roelofs effect)?  
The pattern of results observed in Experiment 2 differs from that of other attentional 
mislocalization reports in the literature. Suzuki & Cavanagh (1997) provided evidence 
that the locus of attention can repulse the perceived location of a target – the attentional 
repulsion effect (ARE). Using a paradigm very different from ours, their participants 
performed a vernier acuity task while attention was directed to the periphery, which 
caused a small repulsion in the target’s perceived position (with a leftward shift of 
attention, the target was perceived to be to the right of its actual position). The results of 
Chapter III cannot be attributed to variance due to eye movements, as this variance was 
removed during the analyses. It may be that the mislocalizations seen with endogenous 
cues were caused by a distortion of the midline, with the midline repelled in a direction 
opposite the shift of attention. To investigate this possibility, participants could be asked 
to make a pointing movement or a saccade to perceived midline after the offset of the 
endogenous cue (in a task analogous to that of Dassonville & Bala, 2004). While this 
would be a step toward directly measuring the distortion of subjective midline, there are 
potential concerns with this design. In particular, the size of the mislocalization caused by 
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the endogenous cue was very small compared to the typical Roelofs effect, increasing the 
chance of a type II statistical error even if the effect is real. Second, a shift of visuospatial 
attention would undoubtedly accompany the motor response of the participant (Sheliga, 
Riggio, & Rizzolatti, 1994). This additional shift of attention may disrupt the distortion of 
midline caused by the attentional cue. For example, a the planning of a pointing 
movement toward the perceived target location may evoke concomitant shift of attention, 
which could distort the effect caused by the initial attentional cue. 
 
Contextual processing in the rSPL 
Recent work by Walter and Dassonville (2012) has demonstrated that relatively 
distinct regions of parietal cortex (superior parietal lobe and precuneus) are recruited 
when an observer performs a search for a target object obscured by extraneous contextual 
information (the Embedded Figures Task, or EFT; see Figure 3). To successfully solve 
the search task and locate the target shape, the effects of the irrelevant contextual 
information in the complex image must be suppressed. Interestingly, performance in the 
EFT has been shown to correlate with an observer’s susceptibility to various visual 
illusions, like the rod-in-frame illusion (Witkin & Asch, 1948) and the Roelofs effect 
(Walter & Dassonville, unpublished observations). These behavioral interrelationships 
predict that the same brain structures affected by the context of the EFT also process the 
illusion-inducing contextual information provided in the rod-in-frame and the Roelofs 
illusions. Indeed, Walter & Dassonville (2008) showed that the illusion-inducing 
contextual cues of the Roelofs effect activated the same parietal regions that were active 
in the EFT. 
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 Although Walter and Dassonville (2012) found a specific region of the parietal 
cortex that was activated by the contextual information in the EFT, it is still unclear what 
this activation represents. One possibility is that this brain region is itself involved in 
processing the contextual information, directly causing less-than-optimal search 
performance. On the other hand, it is possible that this region is involved in suppressing 
the effects of the context, which would be critical in the participant’s attempts to perform 
well in these difficult tasks. 
 A potential extension of the rod-and-frame TMS study of Chapter IV involves the 
use of TMS to investigate the specific role that this parietal region plays in the EFT. TMS 
disrupts neural processing in a brain area of interest by generating a very focal, but 
powerful magnetic pulse over the scalp of a normal, healthy individual, which 
temporarily disrupts the stimulated area of the brain. If this parietal region were directly 
involved in processing the contextual information provided in the EFT displays, then 
disrupting this area would be expected to increase EFT performance. On the other hand, 
if this region were involved in actively suppressing the effects of the context, TMS would 
be expected to decrease search performance.  
TMS is a valuable tool for addressing questions of functionality in the brain, however 
individual variations in cortical anatomy (i.e., sulcal and gyral folding) can limit its 
generalizability across subjects. Therefore, when performing TMS studies, it would be 
useful to perform a functional localizer scan within the target group of subjects, and then 
test the same subjects in the subsequent TMS protocol. This allows null findings to be 
interpreted with more confidence – if TMS has no effect on EFT performance, it could be 
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reasonably concluded that the rSPL is not involved in processing the context present 
within the complex image. 
Functional magnetic imaging work examining size constancy has demonstrated that 
the contextual information present in the Ponzo illusion can modulate perception through 
feedback connections from higher levels of visual processing to earlier levels, such as 
area V1 (Murray et al., 2006; Fang et al., 2008). However, the anatomical origin of this 
feedback signal remains a mystery. The Ponzo illusion, like the rod-and-frame and 
Roelofs illusions, is driven by a distortion of the observer’s perception of space. Previous 
research has shown that susceptibility to the Ponzo, rod-and-frame and Roelofs illusions 
are correlated; individuals who experience a greater distortion of perceived vertical and 
perceived straight-ahead in the rod-and-frame and Roelofs illusions, respectively, also 
show a larger overestimation of object size in the Ponzo illusion (Walter & Dassonville; 
2009). Given these findings and the results of Chapter IV, right SPL should be considered 
a viable candidate for the origin of the feedback signal that provides a modulatory effect 
on neural activity in early visual areas, according to the egocentric context provided by 
the visual scene.  
To explore the nature of this feedback, participants would complete a version of the 
Ponzo illusion, in which they must judge the size of two spheres in the presence or 
absence of the illusion-inducing context. If the Ponzo illusion is driven by feedback from 
the right SPL, a reduction in illusion susceptibility would be predicted after rTMS to right 
SPL, compared to a control site at vertex. Task performance would not be expected to 
change when the illusory context is absent. 
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Temporal differences in visual illusions 
Studies examining differences in the time course of contextual influences on visual 
processing have increased in the animal literature (Bair, Cavanaugh, & Movshon, 2003). 
However, similar issues have not been systematically addressed in humans. In particular, 
the temporal effects of illusory context on visual perception remain untested (see 
Danckert et al., 2002). The studies conducted in Chapter IV demonstrate that the context 
of the tilted frame in the RFI is processed, at least in part, in the right posterior parietal 
lobe. In contrast, the simultaneous tilt is thought to be caused by inhibitory interactions 
between orientation sensitive columns in primary visual cortex. If these illusions are 
operating at different levels of the visual hierarchy, differences in the time course of the 
illusory-inducing context might be observed.  
A future avenue for study could vary the time between the onset of the context (e.g., 
the rotated frame) and the reported stimulus (e.g., the rod). For example, the onset of the 
frame could precede the onset of the rod in some trials, and lag behind the rod in others. 
Using a variety of stimulus onset asynchronies would allow for a careful mapping of the 
time course of the illusion. Illusions occurring early in the visual system, like the 
simultaneous tilt, may only occur when the context is presented before, or in conjunction 
with the central grating. Alternatively, the RFI may have effects over a larger temporal 
window due to rapid and sustained feedback from posterior parietal cortex. Future studies 
could probe the time courses of “global” and “local” visual illusions to characterize when 
contextual cues are bound with the target stimulus. Employing converging paradigms will 
serve to strengthen the case for dissociable contextual processing modules in the human 
visual system. 
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